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I. Belarus and The European Union 
ANTANAS VALIONIS: «THE CURRENT SITUATION ALLOWS US TO RECONSIDER 
THE EXISTING EU POLICY»
An exclusive interview of the Lithuanian Republic Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
Lithuania was one among the ﬁrst European Union countries to ratify the EU Constitu-
tion. Following frustrated results of the referendums in France and Netherlands, the future of 
this document has become unclear. A crisis is obvious in the European Union. What is today’s 
stand of Vilnius to overcome the difﬁculties? 
- A.V. In the past, there have been instants when the EU member states could not reach 
agreement on important issues. However, the experience shows that, sooner or later, a consen-
sus will be reached. Undoubtedly, it is very difﬁcult to avoid contradictions when solutions are 
to be taken unanimously, as in the case of the new ﬁnancial perspective or ratiﬁcation of the 
Treaty on the Constitution for Europe. In our opinion, the EU Constitution is a document that 
should reinforce the EU, making the EU policy more consistent and helping the EU to reach a 
greater unity in the world. We have expressed this opinion by ratifying this document.
I think that «No» given at the EU Constitution referendums in some countries clearly 
proves the need of reforms in the EU. Voting against the Constitution, people expressed their 
disagreement with the existing situation. Even by voting against the treaty aimed at reforming 
the European Union, though it may seem paradoxical. We see also positive aspects in the cur-
rent situation. It will allow us to reconsider the existing EU policy and will stimulate serious 
discussions about the future lines of development in Europe. This is positive, because it will 
allow the EU to cope with the exciting problems in a more effective way. It is essential to reach 
agreement on the most important issues; above all, an agreement on the new ﬁnancial perspec-
tive. I am sure that there is a ﬁrm political resolve to do this. As regards the EU Constitution, 
following two unfavourable referendums in France and Netherlands, it has been ratiﬁed by 
four other countries. 
One year after the accession to the European Union, the number of EU supporters in 
Lithuania is rather great. It is even greater than I expected; it means they are not disenchanted 
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with the EU membership. Before the accession, we had not given non-realistic pledges, and 
now citizens of Lithuania can feel the impact of the European policy. 
The activism and positive dynamics of the Lithuanian foreign policy in the light of the 
European Union good neighbourhood policy in relation to the so-called «new neighbours» 
of the EU are widely recognized. It is not a secret that the EU policy is becoming more rigid, 
for example, in relation to such neighbour as Belarus. Hence, many observers are inclined to 
see that Vilnius shows, so to say, improvisation in its policy towards the Belarusian neighbour. 
That is, the demonstration of a less rigid approach. What is your attitude to opinions of these 
observers?
- A.V. I would like to state that Lithuania, as a member state of the European Union, 
agrees with the EU policy in relation to the Republic of Belarus, and our activity in relations 
with Belarus is not accidental. Firstly, we should not forget that Belarus is a neighbour state, 
related to Lithuania not only by a common border (which is the eastern border of the EU!), but 
also by close economic and social ties and a common historical experience. Secondly, Lithua-
nia is not interested in restricting mutual relations with its neighbours; therefore, a rigid, some-
times even too rigid stand of the EU, may have impact on the already established mutually 
beneﬁcial relations among neighbours. For this reason, this policy of Lithuania deserves the 
name of what you called «improvisation». We do not think that this is bad, because it proves, 
once again, that we have selected the right way in developing our relations with Belarus, both 
bilaterally and at the European level. 
Both states try to preserve and further develop the links that are beneﬁcial for the popu-
lations of our states, without breaking social ties and developing businesses. The EU is con-
cerned about human rights and development of civil society, which is reﬂected in its policy. 
These aspects of relations are not alien to us; therefore, preserving our positions, we are trying 
to ﬁnd solutions acceptable for both parties. 
According to some mass media, Vilnius is concerned about the fact that the current scan-
dal around the Russian-Estonian Treaty on the border signiﬁes the beginning of a comprehen-
sive review of the Moscow policy towards Baltic States, making it more rigid. Can we consider 
the fact of not inviting, deﬁantly, the President of Lithuania to the festivity in Kaliningrad as a 
manifestation of such more rigid policy of Russia? 
- A.V. Russia made a decision that is difﬁcult to understand — not to invite Presidents 
of Lithuania and Poland, neighbours and essential partners of the Kaliningrad Oblast, to attend 
festivities devoted to the Day of the City in Kaliningrad. We do not understand what were the 
objectives of the Russian party — they missed the opportunity to make a powerful impetus for 
developing neighbourhood relations and cooperation. 
We could have seen various complicated issues in the relations between Lithuania and 
Russia; however, they have been resolved by mutual efforts in a constructive spirit. The fact of 
non-inviting is not beneﬁcial for Russia itself and has not imparted any constructiveness to our 
relations. However, we are sure that this will not have a major impact on our relations. 
There is a growing tension between Warsaw and Minsk, which is driven by the situations 
around the Union of Poles in Belarus. The festivities in Kaliningrad and the growing activity 
of the Russian «Gazprom» can hardly add any «warmth» to the cooled relations between Vil-
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nius and Moscow. The rigid anti-Western policy of the ofﬁcial Minsk can be added to this list 
of negative events. What is your opinion, Mr. Minister: can we speak about some special situ-
ations around the region of Lithuania–Kaliningrad–Poland–Belarus? 
- A.V. Expansion of the EU and NATO, democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, 
their orientation towards European integration, the similar stand of Moldova have radically 
changed the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe. Very important geopolitical changes 
have taken place over a very brief period of time. For example, the Kaliningrad Oblast has be-
come a neighbour of two countries from the European Union, which opens unprecedented op-
portunities for development in this region. Now, it is very important to ﬁnd tools meeting the 
interests of the EU and Russia and to develop projects making this happening. 
Belarus is a European country and the people of Belarus deserve living in a democrat-
ic, modern and prosperous state. Unfortunately, A. Lukashenko is more oriented towards the 
USSR of the period of stagnation, though we all know too well what happened to the USSR. 
The only way forward is democratization and reforms. Belarus, ﬁrst of all, needs a strong civil 
society — this is the ﬁrst step towards creation of a democratic and prosperous state. 
What is, in your opinion, the future international event that can be considered the main 
event in the remaining months of 2005? 
- A.V. I think that even the most important event will not turn the world over. More im-
portant are not the events, but problems and issues that should be solved. We know these is-
sues; therefore, we will strive to ﬁnd positive solutions to these issues through joint efforts of 
international public. 
Questions were asked by Roman Yakovlevsky. 22.09.05.
BRONISLAW GEREMEK: «THE BELARUSIAN REGIME IS A DESTABILIZING FAC-
TOR IN THE REGION»
Eleven known Polish public ﬁgures called to support Belarusian dem-
ocrats. 
Eleven known Polish public ﬁgures made a call to support Belarusian democrats. This 
call was signed by the ﬁlm director Andrzei Waida, one of the most known leaders of «Solidar-
ity» Bogdan Borusewicz, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Wladislau Bartoszewski … 
More and more Polish politicians openly speak about the fact that radical sanctions will 
be applied against Belarusian ofﬁcials and their entry to Poland will be signiﬁcantly restricted. 
In particular, the view on the situation was presented by Bogdan Borusewicz, one of the lead-
ers of the Pomorsk region. When Mr. Borusewicz was the Vice Prime Minister, he was the head 
of the joint Belarusian–Polish Commission on interregional cooperation. Now he is member of 
the Senate (in the past, he was twice elected member of the Parliament) and says that he will 
personally initiate introduction of economic sanctions against Belarus. He explains this radical 
change of his views as follows: 
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- Poland was against the sanctions towards Belarus which were proposed by the Euro-
pean Union. This is explained by the fact that we are neighbours and must solve speciﬁc is-
sues together. Besides, we did not want to make the life of Polish minorities in Belarus more 
complicated. These were two reasons which made us come against sanctions proposed by the 
European Union. Moreover, when the EU prohibited entry visas to some Belarusian ofﬁcials, 
Poland did not follow suit. However, now it is quite probable that, following parliamentary and 
presidential elections, our country will come up with the initiative in the European Parliament 
to introduce economic sanctions against Belarus. Recently, the trade turnover of Belarus with 
the EU countries has made almost 40%. And this is a serious argument!
The former head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland and current deputy of the 
European Parliament Bronislaw Geremek thinks that Europe will support such initiatives. The 
former minister stresses that the Belarusian regime is a destabilising factor in the region and 
they have to respond adequately to this. 
- Until recently, there has been a weighty argument in the European Union that Belarus 
is a lost cause and, therefore, no need to deal with it. Or else, it is no use dealing with it, be-
cause they will not allow doing anything, there. And only in the recent time, primarily through 
the inﬂuence of representatives of Poland and Lithuania, they have begun to understand that 
more resolute actions are needed. Now, it is very important that Europe should not view any-
more the affairs of Belarus as affairs of Poland, Lithuania or Slovakia, but as affairs of the en-
tire Europe. I think we have found the right direction in this respect. 
This point of view of the former minister is shared by another former minister, now 
deputy of the European Parliament Dariusz Rosati: 
- Until now, the European Union has thought that Belarus is a country located some-
where in … Australia. However, Belarus has become a direct neighbour of the European Union 
and has a common border with it. And this fact should be taken into consideration. Because we, 
Poles, cannot agree, for example, with the stand of France which thinks that Belarus — and 
until recently Ukraine — are within the interests of Russia exclusively. We do not agree with 
this, because we are concerned with what is happening just across our border. We want to see 
Belarus and Ukraine democratic countries. I want to remind that the European Union has no 
contacts with President Lukashenko. However, we must also give much more support to non-
governmental organisations in Belarus, especially to students and young people. The Belaru-
sian people, just as the Ukrainians, will come to power by itself. However, what is needed is 
that the Belarusian young people clearly see the difference between the authoritarian and to-
talitarian system and market democracy which exists in our countries.
Incidentally, the letter signed by eleven public ﬁgures reminds that only one year ago the 
Polish public warned that repressions against Belarusian citizens would be enhanced. How-
ever, the support from the Polish state «was limited by verbal support». This is little, because 
the atmosphere of Stalin-epoch fears, as well as the cult of Stalin are revived in the Belarusian 
society. In opinion of those who signed the letter, the situation in Belarus is becoming critical. 
Therefore, it needs speciﬁc support and interests on the part of the European Union, including 
the adoption of the «joint policy in relation to Russia, because there may be no normal coop-
eration between Moscow and democratic states while Russia supports the dictatorship». 
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Poles can be understood — they want to see Belarus as a reliable partner and predictable 
neighbour. And this can be only a democratic, sovereign and European Belarus. 
Vladimir Glod. Gdansk–Warsaw–Minsk. 29.09.05.
EUROPE’ GROWING CONCERN WITH THE BELARUSIAN SITUATION
The European Parliament is pressing on the European Commission to 
facilitate democratisation in Belarus, while Moscow is pressing on Lu-
kashenko in its own interests 
In the last months, the European Parliament has taken several resolutions on the policy 
of the ofﬁcial Minsk, containing strict lines. The last resolution was dated 29 September last 
year. What should be done with this European enfant terrible? Among other measures, in item 
17, the European Parliament «calls on the Council and the Commission to raise the issue of 
Belarus in the negotiations with the Russian authorities so as to outline joint responsibility for 
actions that would lead to concrete democratic transformations in this country». This thesis is 
repeated in different resolutions with small variations. Thus, if we look up the similar docu-
ment of 7 July 2005, we will ﬁnd actually the same wording in item 16. This refrain already 
causes noticeable irritation among a signiﬁcant part of internal political opponents of Lukash-
enko. They think that such appellation to the Kremlin is like of a voice of one crying in the 
wilderness. Therefore, they raise a sharp rhetorical question: Is it time for the West to renounce 
its illusions about the beneﬁcial role of Moscow in the hypothetical process of reﬁnement of 
the Belarusian regime?
It is indicative that leaders of the right Russian opposition call on Europe to see the 
Kremlin not through rosy glasses. We had a talk in Brussels with Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of 
the Russian party «Yabloko». Visiting Brussels on the invitation of the European Parliament, 
this Moscow leader called Western colleagues not to close their eyes on the authoritarian char-
acter of the Putin regime, who started to curb democracy and civil freedoms in the country. We 
think it is useful to reproduce a fragment of our talk in literal terms. 
The last resolution of the European Parliament on Belarus again has a note of hope: 
allegedly, Russians can in some way inﬂuence the Lukashenko regime and help to democra-
tise the country. What do you think: to what extend are such hopes grounded, or are them il-
lusions? 
- G. Ya. These are illusions. The present regime of Belarus is the regime that Russia 
wants to see there. That is all. If it wanted to see another regime, this other regime would have 
been in place long ago. 
Why then does Europe persistently repeat this thesis about the Russian factor from one 
resolution to another?
- G. Ya. Simply, because it does not know what to do. Because, this is a really compli-
cated topic. 
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What should be done, in your opinion? It is too obvious that opposition forces are not 
sufﬁcient. The country has a relative economic stability (another question is: what are the roles 
played by Russian subsidies). In any way, the society is sleeping today… 
- G. Ya. These problems must be solved, to a signiﬁcant degree, in Moscow. For ex-
ample, I do whatever I can to help Belarus in this context. In general, any positive changes in 
Moscow will immediately lead to positive changes in Belarus. The fate of Belarus signiﬁcantly 
depends on what will happen to Russia. I personally do not like to see Belarus as a battleﬁeld 
between Europe and Russia. 
What is your short-term prediction: will the Kremlin undoubtedly support Lukashenko 
during the 2006 elections?
- G. Ya. I do not know. The Kremlin will solve its own task: to retain Belarus within its 
sphere of inﬂuence. If Lukashenko is needed for this, he will remain. But if the issue can be 
solved without Lukashenko, the Kremlin will be happy to do without him. They will be purely 
pragmatic in their approach. 
Also in the European Parliament in Brussels, a dialogue was held with the Chair of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Rene vad der Linden. «In my opinion, Rus-
sia has to play an important role to turn Belarusian towards Europe», he stated. He also added 
that he was not a champion of the total isolation of Belarus.
The author of this message asked: Is it possible to believe in the Kremlin ability to help 
democratisation in Belarus, when many speak about the rapprochement between Putin and Lu-
kashenko regimes? It turned out that the Chairman of the PACE did not quite agree with this. 
He agreed that Moscow has problems with freedom of mass media, human rights, etc. How-
ever, Mr. Van der Linden reminded that when last June the Council of Europe discussed the 
report on the progress of Moscow commitments before this organisation, members of the Rus-
sian delegation accepted many critical remarks in a constructive way. 
Unfortunately, out interlocutor was pressed for time and I did not have time to remind 
that at the same, during the session in Strasbourg, the head of the Russian delegation and the 
Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs Konstantin Kosachev stated that his 
country planned to reduce its fee to the PACE budget. Though he asked not to correlate this 
with the strict formulations in the above report, it could not be thought accidental. Mr. Kosa-
chev even did not try to conceal his indignation at the fact that PACE recommended Moscow 
to build its relations with Minsk depending on the democratic reforms in Belarus. He stated 
this immediately in Strasbourg, and then in Moscow, some days later. «We think absolutely im-
proper the recommendation for Moscow how to build its relations with a third country which 
is not a member of the Council of Europe and has not any commitments to it. This recommen-
dation is a colossal political blunder of the PACE». That’s how the «Interfax» agency cited the 
statement of Kosachev at the press conference in the Russian capital on 27 June. 
It is noteworthy that the fact that Belarus, due to violations of human rights, has re-
mained the only country in Europe which is not a member of the Council of Europe is present-
ed almost as valour! Perhaps, neither Strasbourg nor Brussels read the reports about this press 
conference? Or they did not hear a series of statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs defending the ofﬁcial Minsk? Anyway, even following this happening, resolutions of 
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the European Parliament persistently reproduce the thesis about the need «to raise the issue of 
Belarus at the negotiations with Russian authorities».
«There are two models for replacement a regime: conventionally speaking they are 
American and European models. Naturally, I am a champion of the European model». That 
was the answer to my question in Brussels by Graham Watson, leader of the third most im-
portant factions in the European Parliament «Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe». 
The issue is, whether the united Europe has any real levers to inﬂuence the Belarusian situ-
ation. (This conversation, just as a series of others, took place during the visit of Belarusian 
journalists to the European Parliament on the invitation of the Vice Speaker Janusz Onyszke-
wicz and the group «Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe».)
«We are amazed that countries which had some degree of welfare in the time of the 
Soviet Union are now rolling towards dictatorship», stated Mr. Watson. He also added: «We 
welcome the fact that the Belarusian opposition has joined its forced and elected a single can-
didate». As the leader of the group put it, now Europeans «understand better what is happening 
in Belarus». Graham Watson also stated that «concern about the Belarusian situation in Europe 
is increasing». «In my understanding, Belarus is part of Europe», stressed the member of the 
Parliament. At the same time, he agreed with the opinion that not everyone in the European 
Union feels it. «Most of the people in our countries are concerned with their own problems», 
noted the interlocutor. He acknowledged that statements of the European Parliament are rather 
declarative in their character. However, this British deputy added that, «We, in the European 
Parliament, are trying to push on other institutions of the European Union». According to Mr. 
Watson, the Council of the European Union pays more attention to elaboration of a common 
external policy and security policy. The head of the group hopes that fruits of the coordinated 
and strong policy of the European Union towards Belarus can be seen soon. Mr. Watson added 
that no forced measures are meant: «We are not going to send troops to change the regime 
in Belarus». The interlocutor noted that the EU can inﬂuence the situation in Belarus by us-
ing «three tools», i.e., economic impact, diplomacy, and support of democratic forces in the 
 country. 
It should be also pointed out that representatives of the «Alliance of Liberals and Demo-
crats for Europe» are in favour of a more active approach by the European institutions to the 
issue of democratic reformations in Belarus. In particular, members of the group promote the 
project of the independent radio broadcast for Belarus. On 1 July 2005, the head of the group 
Graham Watson and the Vice Speaker of the European Parliament Janusz Onyszkewicz (also a 
member of the same faction) visited Minsk so as to study the situation in the country and estab-
lish contacts with Belarusian politicians. In particular, these European deputies had a meeting 
with Aleksandr Milinkevich, who was later elected as a single candidate from the democratic 
forces for the 2006 presidential elections. 
In his turn, Janusz Onyszkewicz, answering in Brussels to my question about whether 
the united Europe sees any effective tools for inﬂuencing the Belarusian situation, assured that 
deputies of the European Parliament would, in the future, continue their pressure on the Eu-
ropean Commission so as to help democratisation in Belarus. The interlocutor acknowledged 
that opportunities of the European Union in terms of inﬂuencing this country are rather limited, 
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although it has ﬁnancial resources to support reformation processes in different states. Accord-
ing to this politician, the problem is that the Belarusian leaders do not show readiness to re-
ally develop relations with the united Europe. On the other hand, as Mr. Onyszkewicz noted, 
there is also a problem of inertia of European institutions. This prevents them from elaborat-
ing a more ﬂexible policy towards Belarus. «The bureaucratic machine of the European Com-
mission is very slow and inert, however, we will move faster little by little», summed up the 
interlocutor. 
The author of this article could not but ask the following equation: Do you believe that 
Moscow can help in democratizing Belarus? Janusz Onyszkewicz answered that regimes of 
Putin and Lukashenko do come closer to each other. According to the Vice Speaker of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the Kremlin supports the current authorities in Minsk because, following 
its defeat in Ukraine, «it cannot afford a similar scenario in Belarus». At the same time, accord-
ing to this politician, «in a certain situation it may become not beneﬁcial for Moscow to have 
such a partner, isolated from the entire world»; then, it may put its stake on another leader. In 
this context, the Vice Speaker recalled a well-known story, whether an anecdote or a true one, 
that when Stalin was irritated by Krupskaya, he warned her that it was possible to ﬁnd another 
wife of Lenin… 
Mr. Onyszkewicz is convinced that the united Europe must help in the development of 
civil society and political pluralism in Belarus. In his opinion, to avoid the «Romanian scenar-
io» in the country, it is necessary to try to change mentality of those who are at power. «They 
managed to do this in Poland, and there was roundtable instead of a revolution», indicated Mr. 
Onyszkewicz, keeping in mind the negotiations between the government of Jaruzelski and the 
opposition, organised in 1989, which were the beginning of the democratic transformation of 
the Polish society. 
Janusz Onyszkewicz is a veteran of the legendary «Solidarity», a former political pris-
oner, and he knows what he is speaking about. He recollected an episode from his own biog-
raphy: it was 1983, martial law in Poland and the peak of repressions. He was professor of 
mathematics and a member of the opposition, in handcuffs. And then, all of sudden, a security 
ofﬁcer said to him in private, that they, who were meant to prosecute and suppress, were talk-
ing in low voices among themselves about what would the then prisoners do to them when 
they came to power. According to the member of European Parliament, members of the state 
machine must feel that today’s authorities are not for ever. To this end, champions of public 
changes should show their force and unity. Therefore, the Vice Speaker of the European Par-
liament stressed that «it is a pleasure to know that the opposition has its single candidate for 
the presidential elections». 
The recent return to Minsk of the Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Pauliak was assessed 
by his compatriot Mr. Onyszkewicz as a normal and logical step. We should remind that the 
ambassador was recalled to Warsaw in July last year, at the peak of the diplomatic crisis, re-
lated to the attack by the Belarusian authorities at the «too independent» leaders of the Union 
of Poles in Belarus. The return of Mr. Pauliak was considered by a number of politicians and 
political scientists as a manifestation of the lack of consistency and the weakness of Poland’s 
policy in the Belarusian direction. Mr. Onyszkewicz does not fully agree with this assessment. 
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He stressed that his country did not declare a diplomatic war on Belarus, but only recalled the 
head of its mission for consultations. According to Mr. Onyszkewicz, now, following the con-
sultations, the Polish ambassador had a broad ﬁeld of activities. At the same time, he did not 
think that the recent meeting between the Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas and 
his Belarusian counterpart Sergey Sidorsky was a well-thought step on the part of Vilnius.
It should be added in this respect, that Kiev’s statements about its readiness to export 
to Belarus the fruits of its orange revolution started to subside. Recently, the new Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Eranukhov visited Minsk; a meeting between Lukashenko and Yushchenko 
cannot be ruled out in the foreseeable future. The Ukrainian leadership obviously is not will-
ing to spoil rapidly developing trade and economic relations with its northern neighbour. Or, 
to aggravate the internal political situation after the split in the «orange» team on the eve of 
parliamentary elections that will be difﬁcult for Yushchenko and his colleagues. 
These pragmatic approaches have brought about some disenchantment among the Be-
larusian champions of democracy, who were earlier inspired by the «orange revolution». In 
general, analysing unexpected curtseys of the neighbours to the ofﬁcial Minsk, some Belaru-
sian political scientists, for example, make a conclusion that the Lukashenko regime has more 
chances to successfully oppose the pressure both from the West and from the East. Yes, there 
is some pressure from Russia, too. But what is this? 
It is indicative that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov, speaking in Paris 
on 11 October, supported the ofﬁcial Minsk and called on the West to avoid black-and-white 
assessments of the situation in Belarus. In the past, too, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has several times spoken against «export of democracy» to the post-Soviet states. It is obvious 
that Moscow gives the West a new a clear message: Do not touch the country which is within 
our sphere of inﬂuence! Now the ball is in ﬁeld of the West. 
Aleksandr Klaskovsky. Brussels–Minsk. 24.10.05.
VACLOV STANKEVIČ: A BROAD AND PEACEFUL FRONT IS NEEDED FOR 
 BELARUS’ DEMOCRATIZATION
Interview with the member of the Lithuanian Parliamentary Commis-
sion on NATO
Politicians and analysts continue to comment on the statement made by the Lithuanian 
President Valdas Adamkus to the German newspaper «Welt» about possible attack by Lukash-
enko troops on his country. Mr. Stankevič, you have expressed in press the opinion that the 
journalist is rather misinterpreted the idea of the President. Nevertheless, there is no smoke 
without ﬁre… Possibly, Lithuanian leadership sees some grounds for concern about security 
of their country related to the policy of the Belarusian regime? 
- V. S. I am very closely related to the issue of the national security, because I am the 
head of the Parliamentary Commission on NATO. In no way do we perceive Belarus as a po-
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tential enemy. In no way! I think that the President Adamkus, if you ask him now, would not 
conﬁrm the opinion about Belarus as a potential threat to Lithuania. On the other hand, we 
have political views on the global processes that are different from the views of the Belarusian 
leaders. Perhaps, when Mr. Adamkus gave his interview, he meant, ﬁrst of all, the style of gov-
ernment in Belarus. This country is governed, putting it mildly, not always according to the 
laws. Many decisions are taken through presidential decrees. 
That is to say, a feeling of threat can appear among the neighbours because of unpre-
dictable behaviour of the ofﬁcial Minsk, cannot it? 
- V. S. Indeed, one thing is when a country is ruled by democracy, with a democratic 
parliament and deputies vested with due powers, like, say, in Lithuania. Then, the policy of the 
country is predictable. And it is quite different when everything, or almost everything, depends 
on the will of one person. Then, of course, there is a moment of unpredictability. But I want to 
stress once again: this does not mean that we, in Vilnius, see Belarus as a country that can at-
tack us tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, or in a month. Belarus is a very important economic 
partner for us. I say this not as a witticism — this is really so. For Lithuania, a country which is 
three times smaller than Belarus, its market, cargos coming through our territory, have a high 
signiﬁcance. And from this point of view, it is not wise to view Belarus as an enemy. 
Another argument is, to attack Lithuania, or, say, Latvia today means to attack NATO. 
I think Belarusian authorities also understand this. By the way, working in NATO entities, I 
know very well: they think Belarus also as a very important partner. Again, this is not merely a 
compliment — it is really so. In Brussels, they have an opinion that Minsk plays a worthy part 
in the programme «Partnership for Peace». In the last three years, I have regularly attended 
NATO summits and can argue that Belarus has a good reputation in terms of cooperation. Let 
us see the following: if a country is praised by the NATO entities for cooperation within the 
programme which has such a clear name as «Partnership for Peace», then what kind of war 
can we talk about? 
You have noted that economic cooperation with Belarus, including transit, etc., is very 
important. In this relation, I recollect a recent meeting of your Prime Minister Algirdas Braza-
uskas with his Minsk counterpart Sergey Sidorsky. It had ambiguous repercussions, in particu-
lar, among EU politicians. Don’t you think that sometimes members of the European Union, 
due to economic considerations, somewhat put aside democratic principles, closing their 
eyes on violations of human rights, and build relations with Minsk based on the pragmatic 
 interests? 
- V. S. I would not agree that someone closes his eyes. On one hand, Belarusian transit 
is really very important — and not only this. For example, we have many joint ventures. Eco-
nomic cooperation is facilitated by the fact that, virtually, we do not have a language barrier. 
An in general, we understand each other well, because we have come from the same system 
and have similar mentality. 
However, we never close our eyes on the violations of democracy which really take 
place in Belarus. And if you ask today about this our Prime Minister Brazauskas, he would, 
for sure, give the same answer. Lithuania will inevitably speak about violations of democracy. 
And it speaks about it today — though Minsk does not always like it. You know that we orga-
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nize seminars and conferences on the Belarusian issue. We do not conceal this fact. We speak 
openly that we support opponents of the regime ruling in this country. 
At the same time, we think that the stronger the Belarusian businesses as well as the Be-
larusian economy integration into the economies of democratic countries are, the sooner the 
process of democratization in this country begins. But if we begin to turn away from each other 
in such ﬁelds as economy and culture, then we will move farther apart from one another. But 
we have to come closer. And for this reason, we should develop economic ties in every possible 
way. Therefore, if the Prime Minister Brazauskas meets with his Belarusian counterpart, this is 
quite normal. In the long run — and I always emphasize this — there is a difference between 
the President Administration and the Government of Belarus. Ministers are more economi-
cally-biased than politicians. 
In general, I am among those people in Vilnius who think that our governments must 
cooperate, to put it simply, to the full extent. I am sure that this will help to begin the process 
of democratisation in Belarus in a much faster way. 
You mentioned seminars organised in Lithuania on the Belarusian issue and the support 
to political opponents of Lukashenko. Recently, this issue was raised by General Dementei 
from the Belarusian KGB, presenting a bill on counteracting extremism in the Parliament. Ac-
cording to his words, some support bases to exert impact on Belarus are being formed in the 
neighbouring countries, including Lithuania. In this context, tracking and possible training of 
extremist groups was mentioned. How can you comment on this statement? 
- V. S. I categorically disagree with him. I repeat: we do not conceal the fact when we 
organize activities involving Belarusian opposition. For example, recently, there was a semi-
nar under the auspices of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. If we see that the Belarusian 
opposition is deprived of the possibility to present their opinion publicly in their own country, 
that nongovernmental newspapers are closed and there are no independent TV channels like in 
Lithuania, then we think it our duty to give these people an opportunity for free statement of 
their views about the future of Belarus. However, everything is done in a legal way! We do not 
urge people to start riots or to come to the streets. It is even more improper to speak about some 
plans of intervention on our part. We have our own problems! The fact that we do not always 
ﬁnd a common language at the political level with the ofﬁcial Minsk does not mean that they 
prepare some revolution for Belarus in Vilnius. We have no any thoughts about this!
OK, let us put aside revolutionary scenarios. Then, the issue of effective inﬂuence by 
Europe and its institutions on the Belarusian situation comes up. For example, the European 
Parliament adopts relevant resolutions. They include a lot of correct items; however, the ideas 
and proposals often are stuck at the level of executive authorities of the European Union. In 
the European Commission, for example, they say: we have no leverage or tools to implement 
these plans. Or else: the rules do not allow sending money for some programmes of democra-
tization. How, in your opinion, can this declarative approach in the approach of Europe to the 
Belarusian issue be overcome? 
- V. S. I agree that there is little beneﬁt of declarations and resolutions. In the recent 
years, they have not brought any tangible beneﬁts. The problem is that in Belarus the tradi-
tional scheme of the opposition coming to power through elections does not operate. Unfor-
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tunately, the election legislation is far from European standards. The same concerns the law 
on press. The opposition publications are closed, and, as a result, the press controlled by the 
authorities is dominant. Thus, the Belarusian opposition is unable, for objective reasons, to 
do what the opposition in any normal democratic country should do. Namely, to explain to its 
people how it sees the future of the country so as to win over the majority of the electorates 
and win the elections. Therefore, I think that we should help the Belarusian opposition in the 
future. We also should do, so to say, some of its work (not because the opposition is so inca-
pable, but because its conditions are unbelievably severe). That is, we must have as broad as 
possible contacts with the rank and ﬁle Belarusian citizens, explaining them the advantages of 
a democratic way. 
Thus, we need not only resolutions and seminars for the opposition leaders — we need 
contacts with ordinary Belarusian people. It should be done through activities of nongovern-
mental organizations, scientiﬁc cooperation, art performances, youth exchanges, etc. In gen-
eral, to facilitate democratization of Belarus, we need a broad front — a front in a good and 
peaceful meaning of this word. We should remember that Belarus is our neighbour. And we 
should not run at breakneck speed to the West, thereby increasing the abyss between our coun-
tries. We need everyday and laborious work for the sake of changes in this country, by commu-
nicating with broad sectors of population, but not only with the political opposition. 
Following the scandal with the Union of Poles in Belarus, analysts started to say that 
Warsaw got its ﬁngers burnt trying to build some special, more advanced relations with Minsk 
based on the principles of good neighbourhood. Now they make a conclusion: you will not 
mitigate the Belarusian regime with a carrot. On the other hand, a whip will not scare it, too. 
How should Europe behave — in a stricter or softer manner — in its relations with Belarusian 
authorities? 
- V. S. I would put it in this way: I would like to see Belarus a free and independent state, 
rather than some unit making part of Russia. I am afraid that, if we rely on the policy of a whip, 
we will push Belarus closer to its big eastern neighbour. Therefore, I support the idea of toler-
ance and cooperation with Belarus at different levels. 
According to the «Welt», the Lithuanian President criticized Brussels for its inefﬁcient 
policy towards Belarus and suggested elaborating a clearer line. What do you think the Presi-
dent meant? 
- V. S. I have repeatedly communicated with the President Adamkus on the issues of for-
eign policy and I know that he sees very well that resolutions alone, or statements on behalf 
of the EU entities, are far from being enough. Statements usually are made to some events, 
for example, when they close one more newspaper or put into prison another politician. How-
ever, the united Europe does not have a system for everyday and consistent work on the Be-
larusian topics. We need to address the issues of Belarus not from time to time, but every day. 
We need to develop in every way contacts with its people. We should not call for revolutions, 
but convince, step by step, broad walks of Belarusian society in the advantages offered by de-
mocracy. 
Questions were asked by Aleksandr Klaskovsky. 07.11.05.
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JUSTAS PALECKIS: «EUROPE SHOULD USE EVERY CHANCE TO BUILD A DIA-
LOGUE WITH MINSK»
An exclusive interview of the deputy, member of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the European Parliament
By the results of a recent session of the ministers of foreign affairs of the EU, Brussels 
threatened the ofﬁcial Minsk with sanctions if the 2006 presidential elections are not just and 
democratic. The proposed sanctions include enlarging the list of the regime ofﬁcials who will 
be rejected visas, as well as freezing of bank accounts of the Belarusian leadership. However, 
Belarusian ofﬁcials hardly ever visit the West at all. Besides, they are not so naïve so as to keep 
money within the reach of Brussels. Then, how effective will these hypothetical sanctions be? 
- J. P. I think that enlarging the list of the regime ofﬁcials who are banned to visit West-
ern countries would have, rather, a tangible moral impact. This would emphasise that Belarus 
in the modern Europe looks like «a white crow» because of its leadership. Moreover, the coun-
try is not represented, for example, in the Council of Europe. As regards freezing of the bank 
accounts, then, probably, this sanction could affect interests of some Belarusian ofﬁcials. As 
far as I know, the general trend is that they prefer to keep money in more stable and ﬁnancially 
reliable places, i.e., conventionally speaking, not in the East, but in the West. 
But probably, these sanctions will be too late following the election campaign in Be-
larus, won’t they? Independent experts are stating unanimously that you should not expect just 
elections in this country. Approaching the election day, the authorities are methodically «pro-
tecting» the public and political ﬁeld against a small group of opponents, including party enti-
ties, independent mass media and nongovernmental organization… After the elections, there 
may remain only a scorched earth, and the democratic Europe will have nobody to support. 
Then, perhaps, it is useful to «speed up» the issue of sanctions? 
- J. P. We need to analyse the reaction of Minsk after this statement of Brussels. As far 
as I know, ministers of foreign affairs of the European Union were planning to return to this is-
sue in January. Everything is not that simple. On one hand, the European Parliament is liberal 
with rigid assessments and radical proposals related to the Belarusian issue. On the other, it is 
always more difﬁcult to act than to make declarations. The European Commission has a spe-
ciﬁc responsibly — which is not a small one. 
The European Commissioner on foreign relations Benita Ferrero-Valdner has repeated 
spoken in this respect before our Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as before the entire 
European Parliament. We always feel that the European Commission wants to give the Belaru-
sian authorities some chance to correct their behaviour. In other words, it leaves an opportu-
nity to take steps towards democratization and observance of human rights, as is expected by 
Europe. And if the Belarusian ofﬁcial leader is radiant with optimism and assuredness in the 
victorious outcome of the elections for him, then the following question is grounded: Why not 
to ensure the game according to the rules? Why should he resort to different restrictions for the 
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opponents, if he can win fairly? I think that Brussels has not yet abandoned this way of pos-
ing the question. 
The problem of introduction of economic sanctions is even more delicate. As you known, 
this issue is under discussion in the institutions of the European Union. However, here Brussels 
will weigh up all «pros» and «contras» especially thoroughly. This is known to be a double-
edged sword. Besides, it is important to preclude the following: we meant to hit the ruling top, 
but primarily the lower layers suffered. 
What is your attitude to the initiative by the deputy of the Lithuanian Parliament Vaclov 
Stankevič, who thinks that Lithuania should initiate a dialogue with Belarusian leadership so 
as to push it towards democratization, in particular, of the laws on election and mass media? 
There is widely spread view among politicians and analysts that the Belarusian regime sees 
these jesters only as a sign of weakness of the opposite side.
- Vaclov Stankevič is a recognized expert in the Belarusian situation, both among the 
Lithuanian politicians and in Europe as a whole. I always listen very attentively to his opin-
ions. I think that the proposals of the deputy Vaclov Stankevič deserve attention. Moreover that 
the approaches used before have not given any results. 
However, the attempts to establish, conventionally speaking, more trustworthy relations 
with the ofﬁcial Minsk have also been a ﬁasco. For example, after the known story with the at-
tack on the Belarusian Union of Poles you can hear that many politicians in Warsaw saying: 
we have been wrong trying to be kind with the Minsk regime, hoping to correct it little by little 
— it seems that dictatorship recognizes only one language, the language of force. 
- J. P. Now, there are new political forces in power in Warsaw, and they can review a 
rather broad range of foreign policy lines. As regards Vilnius, I think that the concept, sup-
ported, in particular, by the deputy Vaclov Stankevič, has every right to exist and some chances 
for success. Let us recollect: at the time of cold war the West was speaking even to Stalin, let 
alone Khrushchev or Brezhnev. In this connection, we can point to the eastern policy of the 
German Chancellor Willie Brandt. He tried to have a duologue with GDR, Poland and the So-
viet Union, appealing not only to high principles of human rights, but to elementary common 
sense as well. Were it not for this dialogue, if the idea of a total isolated prevailed, then Gor-
bachev would hardly have appeared. So, I think Europe should use every chance to establish 
with Minsk such a dialogue in terms of elementary common sense. 
Speaking about the problem of support of Belarusian democrats and civic society: isn’t 
Europe here a hostage of its excessive political correctness? Don’t they take too close, in Brus-
sels, to the mechanism of traditional procedures which require, in particular, that foreign aid 
projects be coordinated with the government? Critics say: look, Belarusian authorities have 
blocked in fact all channels of legal aid from outside and they play without any rules! Some 
European politicians have ideas about how to avoid such barriers. Thus, the Vice Speaker of 
the European Parliament Janusz Onyszkewicz suggests creating in the EU institutions a more 
ﬂexible mechanism, i.e., a fund for support of democracy. Perhaps, Western democracies and 
the European Union as a whole should be more ﬂexible, given this Belarusian speciﬁc? 
- J. P. Without going into details of such ideas, I would like to notice that the European 
Parliament has free hands for suggesting such ideas. However, the European Commission is 
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under the pressure of responsibility. They also, I presume, take into account the Russian factor. 
In principle, here we see a normal democratic system of checks and balances in action. The 
European Parliament pushes forward, while the European Commission to some extent keeps 
down these impulses and at the same time listens to the voices of free Parliamentarians. As a 
result, we often have the golden mean — a balanced way of solution. Thus, for example, the 
idea of development of independent radio broadcasting for Belarus was born precisely in the 
European Parliament. And after a while, following discussions, it was materialized in the deci-
sions of the European Commission. 
You mentioned the Russian factor. Indeed, Brussels regularly appeals to Moscow in the 
«Belarusian issue». But they receive no positive response. Recently, the Russian MIA have 
made another statement about disagreement with the EU attempts to present Belarus «as a 
sort of problematic area in terms of democracy». Don’t you have an impression that appeal to 
Moscow asking to help in democratization in Belarus is nothing else, but «a voice of the one 
crying in the wilderness»? Or, they give homage to some ritual, given the fact that Belarus 
is within the tacit area of inﬂuence of Russia? Indeed, Russia is a strong player in this area; 
moreover, it pumps huge amounts of gas and oil to Europe. Therefore, in opinions of some 
Belarusian analysts, these pragmatic considerations take precedence in Brussels when they 
weigh up risks of aggravating conﬂicts with Moscow in relation to the Belarusian issue. Do 
you agree with this? 
- J. P. Yes, of course. Russia stretches over Belarus its protective arm. And this is under-
standable, in a way. Firstly, Russia itself is criticised for violations of human rights. Secondly, 
Belarus is among its allies, which are not very numerous now. On the other hand, for Moscow 
it is not very reasonable to be interested in having a regime that compromises Moscow as its 
ally. 
The European Commission, on the initiative of the European Parliament (also thanks to 
your personal efforts), is gradually developing projects of radio broadcast for Belarus. How-
ever, there are polemic spears broken around them, too. In particular, Belarusian nationalists 
castigate the «German Wave» for the organization of relevant programmes in Russian. Howev-
er, the main issue of efﬁciency of broadcasting. It is considered of low quality, by technical and 
other reasons. At the same time, it looks as if Europe pays much less attention to Internet op-
portunities, as well as to support of independent press and independent journalists in Belarus 
itself. How do you perceive the role of the EU in the issue of freedom of speech for Belarusian 
people and giving them independent information? 
- J. P. I think that radio broadcasting is a rather efﬁcient way of information. I myself 
listen even now, for example, to the Russian service of «Radio Freedom» and ﬁnd a lot of use-
ful information. And the targeted broadcast for Belarus will be even more effective. As regards 
Internet, yes, you are right, we have to think along this line, to press on the European Com-
mission to have relevant aid project elaborated. No doubt, aid should be given to independent 
mass media in Belarus itself. Moreover, that, being abroad, for example, in Germany, no jour-
nalist can tell about the situation and events in Belarus as convincingly as the person who lives 
in this country. 
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One known ﬁgure of the Lithuanian culture, who has visited Belarus, has shared with 
me the following observation: the current regime in Belarus reminds the regime in Lithuania 
before 1940. At that time, we had as the ruler Antanas Smetona who came to power as a result 
of a coup. He introduced censorship, a one-party system, and ruled the country without any 
parliament, but later he allowed electing a one-party parliament… In brief, there are many sim-
ilarities. But if the system of power crated by Smetona was not very much different from what 
we had in the pre-war realities in the Old World, then the current Belarusian regime, which, in 
many respects, is a rollback to the past, is, of course, an eyesore of the modern Europe. 
At the same time, we should recognize that Belarusian authorities, as Smetona did many 
years ago, are very tricky in using the nostalgia of some part of population for paternalism and 
strong hand. By the way, such feelings can be seen in new countries of the European Union. 
Some people perceive democracy there as ineffective, and they wish to have someone, big and 
strong, to take care of their daily life. 
However, for Lithuania and other EU countries, fortunately, the Rubicon has been 
crossed and the rollback to a dictatorship is impossible. In Belarus, the today system of power, 
with support of Moscow, demonstrates a reserve of vitality that is surprising even for many 
experts. 
- J. P. Going back to historic similarities, I would like to emphasize: the force of authori-
tarianism is deceiving; such regime is a colossus with feet of clay. The Lithuanian President 
Smetona, though he concentrated in his hand huge powers, managed to have, in fact, everyone 
against him during his 14 years of rule. Therefore, in 1940, it was rather easy for Moscow to 
create in Lithuania a vision of all-round support for the Soviet power. Putting it differently, au-
thoritarianism turned out to be detrimental for the Lithuanian independence. 
The ofﬁcial Minsk always tells the West: do not teach how to live; we have invented our 
own Belarusian model of development, and we go along our own way. 
- J. P. I agree that there are no ready-made solutions. Probably, there may be unique 
ways for a worthy life of the people. But for me, there is no any doubt that the basic rules of the 
game must be observed. They are well-known. It is alternative democracy, human rights, free-
dom of press, etc. If Minsk started moving along this line, I think a positive mutual response 
of Europe would follow at once. 
Questions were asked by Aleksandr Klaskovsky. 28.11.05.
THE EUROPEAN UNION FACES A NEW CHALLENGE IN THE «BELARUSIAN 
ISSUE»
Champions of a ﬂexible dialogue with Minsk are under a shower of 
criticism
The united Europe has long been trying to ﬁnd approaches to the so-called «Belarusian 
issue». The regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko is obviously falling out of the standards culti-
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vated by the European Union in the ﬁeld of democracy and human rights. Attempts to push the 
country leadership towards mitigating the domestic political situation have not brought any 
visible results. At the same time, the ofﬁcial Minsk demonstrates a surprising indifference to-
wards threats and temptations, equally. Figuratively speaking, the ruling top is not impressed 
by a whip or a carrot from the West. 
What should be done? The most indicative in this respect are the discussions held in 
Vilnius, the capital of one of the new EU states, located literally 2 hours drive from Minsk, the 
bastion of the «last dictatorship in Europe», as it is described by the irreconcilable opponents 
of Lukashenko. Last autumn, in Lithuania, we could hear rather loud voices of politicians who 
suggested a more ﬂexible approach to contacts with the Belarusian leadership. 
We should remind here the following: the European Union, which has very serious 
claims to the ofﬁcial Minsk, some time ago proclaimed the «policy of restricted contacts» with 
the Lukashenko regime. In particular, the EU country leaders were not recommended to have 
meetings with top ofﬁcials from Belarus. The consequences of such approach are very well 
felt by the President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has not been invited, for many years, for ofﬁ-
cial visits to the states of the united Europe. However, these restrictions are known not to have 
pushed the Belarusian leadership to mitigate the realities of the regime, whose authoritarian 
character is recognised by the head of the state himself. 
Champions of a more ﬂexible line in the «Belarusian issue» have the following logics: 
as long the previous approaches have not given any results, we should try to ﬁnd other ways to 
mitigate political ideas of the top rulers in Minsk. It is easy to understand that economic rela-
tions with Belarus are very important for Lithuania. In particular, transit of Belarusian cargo 
is a good source of income for its treasury. Lithuanians are not against the idea that the neigh-
bouring country uses its territory for shipping potassium fertilisers to the port of Klaipeda. In 
general, pragmatic interests of Vilnius play not the least role in the above discussions. (We 
shall add in brackets that other EU countries are also active in developing trade with Belarus, 
though at the same time they criticise its political realities, which allows some opponents of 
Lukashenko to speak about «double-faced West», which, allegedly, «nourishes the dictator-
ship».) 
Then, at the beginning of October, there was an event which caused an ambivalent re-
sponse among European politicians. And it shocked the Belarusian opposition members. The 
Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas met with his Belarusian counterpart Sergey 
Sidorsky. As it was written in the Warsaw newspaper «Rzecz Pospolita», «during the inaugu-
ration of the Belarusian trade exhibition, which was decorated by a huge portrait of the smiling 
Aleksandr Lukashenko, the heads of the governments discussed in a good spirit plans for the 
future trade cooperation».
However, not everyone shared this indignation or irony. For example, the deputy of 
the Lithuanian parliament, an ethnic Belarusian Vaclov Stankevič, stated that «our govern-
ments must cooperate, simply speaking, to the full extent. I am sure that this will help to begin 
the process of democratisation in Belarus in a much faster way». Later, in early November, 
Stankevič, in a special statement, called on the politicians of his country to initiate a dialogue 
with Belarusian authorities so as to push them towards gradual mitigation of domestic politi-
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cal realities. According to the deputy, ﬁrst, it would be advisable to suggest that Minsk should 
democratize the elections legislation and the law on mass media. And this was not a single 
voice. For example, the Lithuanian member of the European Parliament Justas Paleckis in his 
interview «Wider Europe» also emphasized that Europe should use all possible chances to start 
with Minsk «a dialogue from the position of elementary common sense».
However, soon after that, the Belarusian authorities made some actions that looked as 
an open challenge to the West. In particular, it was an offensive against the remaining non-
governmental press and adoption of strict amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal 
Procedural Code. Now, a number of independent publications are deprived of the opportunity 
for being disseminated through the system of retail sales and subscription, which is, in fact, 
the monopoly of the State. The Criminal Code was supplemented by the article «Discrediting 
of the Republic of Belarus», which stipulates deprivation of freedom for criticism of the lo-
cal reality. 
Analysts made a conclusion that the ruling top understood, in its own way, the lessons of 
the «colour revolutions» and decided to preclude repetition of a similar scenario by preventive 
tightening of the nuts. And now, the supporters of the ﬂexible dialogue with Minsk were un-
der a ﬁre of criticism. In particular, the Lithuanian deputy to the European Parliament Vitautas 
Landsbergis, in his interview to the radio «Freedom», stated that amendments to the Belaru-
sian criminal law is «a return of Stalinism» and that «talks about any kind of dialogue with the 
ofﬁcial Belarusian authorities only encourage Lukashenko to take further steps to strengthen 
the dictatorship». Landsbergis suggested that now the European Union should take more rigid 
sanctions against Belarusian authorities. 
Meanwhile, independent political scientists in Minsk share the opinion that neither Eu-
rope nor USA are ready for a serious game in the Belarusian political ﬁeld. The European 
Union is concerned with its own problems of enlargement, while George Bush is stuck in Iraq. 
Besides, the observers stress that the Lukashenko regime is under protection of the Kremlin 
and the European capitals are not eager to start confrontations with it, given the dependence of 
the West on the supplies of Russian energy resources. They prefer, by inertia, to appeal to the 
Russian leadership, asking to help in the attempts to mitigate the Belarusian regime. 
It is indicative that the very experienced diplomat Hans-Georg Wick (the former head 
of the Advisory OSCE group in Minsk), having put aside any diplomacy, called the idea of co-
operation between the EU and Moscow in terms of Belarus democratization as foolishness. In 
the article published on 5 December in the Austrian newspaper «Press», the German politician 
strongly criticized the line of Brussels in the Belarusian issue. In particular, he criticized a de-
clarative, rather than real, support of democratic forces in the country and the delusive hopes 
attached to the Kremlin. 
Polish politicians also call on the European colleagues not to step on the same rakes, 
repeating old mistakes in their approaches to the Belarusian problems. Warsaw is known to 
become under a cold shower, trying to establish with Minsk some special neighbourhood rela-
tions — as it was with Vilnius. Sufﬁce it to remind the much-featured story with the «taming» 
of the Union of Poles in Belarus, as well as a number of incidents when Polish politicians and 
journalists were not allowed to the country. 
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However, in Belarus itself, independent analysts hardly believe in that the EU will be 
able to use some range of effective measures against the ofﬁcial Minsk. According to experts’ 
prognosis, the matter will be, rather, reduced to usual rhetoric, and, possible, some insigniﬁ-
cant, rather symbolic, sanctions that are below the threshold of sensitivity of the local ruling 
top. Indeed, on one hand, the adoption by Minsk of «anti-revolutionary amendments» in the 
Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes caused a quite predictable response from the West. 
Washington, Brussels and other democratic capitals were concerned and indignant; they made 
a disappointing diagnosis (the dictatorship is gaining strength) and called on the Belarusian 
authorities to rethink. On the other hand, the latter are hardly that much short-sighted so as 
not to have presumed indignation of the international democratic community after adjustment 
of the legislation in the Soviet style (in the time of the USSR, they put people into prison for 
«anti-Soviet propaganda and campaigning»). What is left is, to presume that the threatening 
rhetoric of foreign (as well as of domestic) champions of democracy does not scare Lukash-
enko very much. 
The democratic community of Belarus is also openly disenchanted by the EU informa-
tion project oriented to the local public. It is obvious now that the relevant programmes of 
«German Wave», aired from October last year, have not become an event for the local pub-
lic. The programmes are very short and are difﬁcult to tune using short-wave radio receivers 
(young people prefer FM radio). It is indicative that the discussion about the language used in 
the programmes has come to nothing (initially, nationalists were very indignant at the fact that 
the programmes were in Russian, i.e, the language of the «empire»). It has become clear that 
the new project has not, in fact, concerned the audience, and therefore, no need to break the 
spears. Local analysts started to say that Brussels has simply ticked the event. Putting in differ-
ently, it has formally reported to members of the European Parliament who, from time to time, 
adopt resolutions including items on expansion of independent information for Belarusians. 
Meanwhile, the unexpected appointment of the presidential elections for March 2006 
has made the Belarusian issue more relevant on the European agenda. According to some ana-
lysts, Aleksandr Lukashenko and his environment decided to pre-empt, being afraid that the 
West, in its strive to facilitate democratisation of Belarus, might use some new technologies 
that the regime could not fully resist. On the other hand, it is indicative that the elections in 
Belarus were appointed on the second day after the meeting between Lukashenko and Vladi-
mir Putin in Sochi. The latter also conﬁrmed the Russian readiness to supply gas to Belarus 
in the new year on the 2005 conditions. That is, at the price of 46.68 USD per thousand cubic 
metres. This is especially impressive at the background of the price at 220–230 dollars which 
was ostentatiously presented to the «orange» Ukraine. Such economic preferences given to the 
ofﬁcial Minsk on the eve of the election campaign cannot be interpreted but as an explicit sup-
port of the current Belarusian regime by the Kremlin. With all frictions between Putin and Lu-
kashenko (which has been a secret of Punchinello since long), this regime is in the eyes of the 
Russian leaders a bastion for confrontation to «colour revolutions» in the area of geopolitical 
interests of Moscow. A very convincing is the version that Vladimir Putin is interested in the 
Belarusian elections being held before the G8 summit to take place in St. Petersburg next June. 
Otherwise, the Russian leader would, obviously, have a serious pressure from Western partners 
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in the Belarusian issue. But in this event, he can reply in the spirit of the Russian saying: «what 
is the use of brandishing ﬁsts after the ﬁght». Due to this, the Belarusian analytical community 
raises the question: will the West be able to adequately respond to the transfer of the elections 
date and put the problem of democracy before the Kremlin in a proper way?
It is known that in November ministers of foreign affairs of the European Union made 
a statement in which they warned Minsk about possible troubles if steps are not taken to cre-
ate conditions of just elections. In particular, what is meant is the enlargement of the «black 
list» of Belarusian ofﬁcials who are banned to enter the European Union and freezing some 
bank accounts. The EU Council of Ministers promised to return to this issue in January. So, the 
Belarusian observers say that it will be possible soon to assess the degree of consistency in its 
actions. Another thing meant is organization of observation during the presidential elections 
in March, a clear assessment of the election campaign and conclusions of international demo-
cratic community in relation to future action strategies on the Belarusian issue. 
In is clear that it is difﬁcult to make signiﬁcant shifts in the internal Belarusian political 
situation in a brief period. However, the international context of these elections will, for sure, 
determine a lot as regards the prospects for democratization of the country. 
Ales Pramen. 22.12.05.
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II. Issues of security and defence
STEPAN SUKHORENKO: «TODAY, THE THREAT COMES FROM ABROAD»
Interview with the Chairman of the Belarusian KGB
Additions and amendments in the Criminal Code and other legislative acts «on the issue 
of enhancement of liability for actions aimed against human beings and public security», pre-
sented by the Belarusian KGB Head General Stepan Sukhorenko to the Belarusian parliamen-
tarians, caused a negative response by the global community. This new law is to go through 
two readings in the lower house and one in the upper house and, ﬁnally, should be signed by 
the Head of State. 
How fast will the new document pass through all stages of the Belarusian law-making 
process? 
- S. S. During the discussion of the bill, proposed on behalf of Aleksandr Lukashenko 
and coded in the parliamentary agenda as «urgent», one of the deputies began to reproach the 
security institutions for delay. He said that two years passed since the «rose revolution» in 
Georgia and one since the «orange revolution» in Ukraine. The deputy asked: «Why do we 
start to create the law domain so late in our country?» I answered him brieﬂy: «I accept your 
reproach in full». 
When will, in your opinion, follow the next demonstrations of the opposition? 
- S. S. Possibly, you might have seen that before a storm it is always calm: to concen-
trate, to gain forces and get ready. Therefore, they are getting ready now, and getting ready 
seriously. 
Can you give, at least tentatively, more speciﬁc time of expected events? 
- S. S. I have already said in the Oval Hall (the place of sitting of the members of the 
lower house – V.G.) that such demonstrations are planned in the course of the presidential cam-
paign and immediately after the election results are declared… A bill is a preventive measure. 
People who will go to the streets with explosives, combustion materials and metal bars will 
know what they are doing and what will be the consequences for them personally… This is not 
a minor hooliganism. This will be hooliganism with elements of terrorism which will entail 
respective criminal liability. 
What will be the liability?
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- S. S. So far, we propose to extend the term of imprisonment to seven years. 
In your opinion, how serious is the threat of destabilization of the society by the Belaru-
sian opposition?
- S. S. I want to note at once, that the Belarusian opposition by itself does not present any 
threat at all for the society, for destabilization of the society. Today, the threat, of course, comes 
from abroad. Financial, organizational, etc… 
Can you give any speciﬁc addresses from where the threat comes?
- S. S. USA use resources and opportunities of international and foreign nongovern-
mental organizations so as to train special groups in Belarus, which they plan to use for orga-
nizing mass-scale street demonstrations. These are the American National Fund for support 
of democracy, the International Republican Institute, the Poland-based East-European Demo-
cratic Centre, the Stefan Batori Foundation, and the Polish-American Institute of Democracy 
in Eastern Europe. 
Do you think that the proposed changes in the legislation can prevent massive demon-
strations?
- S. S. We think that adoption of this law will help, in many respects, to put down the 
wave that is being prepared. 
FOR INFORMATION – THE CONTENT OF THE ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS IN THE LEG-
ISLATIVE ACTS:
Organization or leadership of a political party (other civil association, or a religious 
organization) whose activities are related to violence against people, or causing them bodily 
injurious, or other infringement upon rights, freedoms and legal interests of people, or to pre-
vention them from execution of their state, public or family duties — shall be punishable with 
arrest up to 6 months, or deprivation of freedom up to 3 years. 
Organization of activities or taking part in activities of organizations and foundations, in 
relation to which a decision on suspension of their activities or their liquidation has come into 
effect, shall be punishable with a ﬁne or arrest up to six months, or deprivation of freedom up 
to two years.
Amnesty will be given to those who voluntarily terminate participation in such organi-
zation and declare about this to relevant state authorities. They will be relieved from criminal 
liability, if their actions do not include elements of another crime. 
Arrest up to six months or deprivation of freedom up to three years can be applied for 
teaching or training of persons for taking part in massive riots, as well as for funding such 
actions. Arrest up to six months or deprivation of freedom up to two years are stipulated for 
teaching or training of persons for taking part in group actions that seriously violate public or-
der, as well as for funding or other material support of such activities, if there are no elements 
of a more serious crime. 
Liability is enhanced for public calls to take over state power or change violently the con-
stitutional system — from six months of arrest to deprivation of freedom up to three years. 
Calls to foreign states, to foreign or international organizations to commit actions det-
rimental to external security of Belarus, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as dis-
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semination of materials containing such calls shall be punishable with arrest from six months 
to three years. If these calls are disseminated through mass media, the punishment increases 
and includes deprivation of freedom from two to ﬁve years. 
The Criminal Code is also supplemented with a new article «Discrediting of the Repub-
lic of Belarus». It means «giving to a foreign state, a foreign or international organization 
of knowingly false data about the political, social, military or international position of the 
Republic of Belarus, the legal status of citizens of the Republic of Belarus or its authorities». 
This stipulates arrest up to six months or deprivation of freedom up to two years. 
Vladimir Glod. 01.12.05.
A DIRIGIBLE INSTEAD OF AN AWACS AIRPLANE
Work is under way in Belarus to build a multi-purpose surveillance 
and reconnaissance aerostat 
According to the opinions in the Military Academy of Belarus, the Army must make 
more active use of aerostats and dirigibles. According to specialists, aerostats and dirigibles 
that were used some time ago actively in the Soviet Union have become outdated by the mod-
ern jet aircraft. The military specialists are sure that aerostats and dirigibles have been forgot-
ten undeservingly and that now there are real opportunities for their revival. Today, science has 
reached the level when it is possible to equip even a simplest anchored aerostat with modern 
communications facilities, as well as software allowing precise surveillance and reconnais-
sance. The shell of the aircraft can be made very strong, nonﬂammable, light and cheap. 
The aerostat in itself is a means for carrying any cargo to a speciﬁed elevation. It is sug-
gested that location of ﬁve-six aerostats at the elevation of 3000–4000 metres with special-
ized onboard equipment will allow reliable radio, telephone and mobile communication across 
the entire territory of Belarus as well as 24-h surveillance over movement of on-land and air 
equipment. 
It cannot be excluded that in the future aerostats can occupy the niche between the ter-
restrial radars and surveillance satellites. At the same time, they are dozens of time cheaper in 
production and operation that long-range radar airplanes. 
Retranslation equipment installed onboard these aerostats can ensure reliable two-way 
communication with crews of helicopters and airplanes during their ﬂights. An aerostat can 
be used to lift to the air an observer who corrects and sends to the artillery battery the shoot-
ing results. According to military experts, the Military Academy of Belarus carries research to 
create a multi-purpose surveillance aerostat through the joint Belarusian-Russian programme. 
In opinions of specialists, such dirigible can be invaluable for defence of the western borders 
of Belarus and become a serious supplement to equipment and machinery available for the air 
force and air defence teams. 
As it was explained in the Military Academy of Belarus, that the scientiﬁc team of this 
educational institution is developing an information surveillance platform which, by its ca-
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pacity, can replace ﬁve patrol airplanes as well as an airplane equipped with AWACS. It is 
planned to install on the information surveillance platform a three-coordinate radar station 
with a phased antenna grid, developed by one of the Belarusian enterprise of the military and 
industrial complex. As it was explained in the Ministry of Defence, this station, lifted by an 
aerostat to the required elevation, will be able to detect immovable and movable targets at dis-
tances «signiﬁcantly exceeding the capacities of the terrestrial detection facilities».
Specialists are sure that the use of a ﬂying command station A-50 (which is not avail-
able at the air forces and air defence teams) for getting early warning information about a mas-
sive attack from the air, including high-precision weaponry, will cost one order of magnitude 
higher. 
Currently, the issue is coordinated with the Russian specialists on the creation of the 
aerostat shell. According to specialists: «It will be made from special synthetic materials that 
ensure not only strength, but also their low-visibility». Besides, Russian and Belarusian enter-
prises are working to create «special self-defence weaponry for an aircraft, i.e., station for ra-
dio electronic suppression of sighting devices of the striking air forces by means of laser SHF 
arms», stated military men. They also think that the aerostat is easy to use by border guards, 
as well.
Besides radar and surveillance operations, dirigibles can transport military equipment, 
arms and personnel. The designers say, that «Using the capacity for vertical landing and take-
off from unspecialized sites, dirigibles can become an irreplaceable transport means». 
Leonid Semenov. 05.12.05.
WAY TO EUROPE
The majority of illegal migrants consider Belarus as a transit state on 
the way of their illegal migration to countries of the European Union
The geographical position of Belarus also brings about a problem of illegal migration 
to this country. According to experts, the territory of Belarus is used to reach Western Europe. 
Foreigners use not only tourism channels, transit passage and business trips, but also seriously 
violate the rules of entry. According to information of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the ma-
jority of migrants consider Belarus as a transit state on the way of their illegal migration to the 
countries of the European Union. Enhancement of the migration policy in Europe, funding of 
their expenses related to strengthening of the borders and organization of ﬁltration areas leads 
to the situation when illegal migrants, who have failed to enter the countries they intended to 
reach, take attempts to settle in Belarus. 
Now, the majority of illegal migrants coming to Belarus are from Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iran, Iraq, India, Sri-Lanka and China, who mainly use the transparency of the Russian-Belaru-
sian border. Russia «supplies» up to 95% of these migrants. Migrants often enter the Russian 
Federation and other CIS countries legally. They also use rather liberal entry and visa condi-
tions. Absence of customs and border control allows them to freely move to other states of the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States, including Belarus. According to ofﬁcial data, every 
year internal authorities of Belarus, together with border guards and KGB ofﬁcers, detain over 
one hundred organized groups going to Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia. In 2003, for 
example, they blocked the way to Europe for some 133 such groups (1925 persons). In 2004, 
to 126 groups (1044 persons). Later, they were deported under escort. During six months of 
2005, 28 groups were detected (including 153 persons). Specialists argue that this problem will 
remain urgent in the future as well. 
THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE GOING FROM BELARUS TO USA HAS INCREASED
As regards emigration of people from Belarus, then, currently, there is no mass-scale 
emigration from Belarus to foreign countries for permanent residence. These people emigrate 
mostly for reuniﬁcation of families or trying to ﬁnd employment. The major part of emigrants 
from Belarus goes to CIS countries. At the same time, according to the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs, there has been some increase in the number of people moving for permanent residence to 
USA and Germany in the last three years. Thus, in 2000, 7.8% of all emigrants from Belarus 
went to USA, while in 2004 this ﬁgure was 8.5%. There has been a growth of emigrants to 
Germany, from 1.9% in 2000 to 9.8% in 2004. 
THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE GOING FROM BELARUS TO ISRAEL HAS REDUCED 
Of interest are statistical data related to the State of Israel where about 100 000 immi-
grants from Belarus live. Since Belarus proclaimed its independence 15 years ago, the number 
of persons going to Israel for permanent residence has reduced almost 20 times. According to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1990, at the peak of emigration, about 98% of all emigrants 
from the country left for Israel for permanent residence. In 1995, about 45% of emigrants from 
Belarus went to Israel and in 2005 less than 5%. It should be noted that in 1990 over 135 000 
people went from Belarus to other states for permanent residence, while in the recent years this 
ﬁgure has made from 10 000 to 14 000 people. 
THE SOURCE OF SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE BELARUS POPULATION 
As regards issues of immigration of foreigners to Belarus, according to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, in the last 5 years it has received mostly immigrants from Russia, Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan. From 1990 till 2000, about 627 000 persons arrived to Belarus from CIS 
countries. In 2001-2004, over 69 000 persons arrived from CIS and Baltic States. Belarusian 
authorities have begun to recognize that currently foreign migration is one of the sources of 
supplementation of Belarus population. For example, in 2000, it supplemented about 30% of 
the natural decrease. In 2003, the ﬁgure was 9.4% and in 2004 it was 4.1%. In the recent years, 
external labour migration has been developing. This is facilitated, primarily, by Belarus inte-
gration into the international labour market. Belarusian citizens go to other countries, while 
foreigners are involved in the labour market in Belarus. The account of migrant labour was be-
gun in 1994. Compared to that year, today the scope of foreign labour migration has increased 
5 times on the basis of agreements and contracts. Assessing the impact of foreign migration on 
WIDER EUROPE: 2005–2006
30
the development of Belarus, it should be noted that in case of non-return migration the country 
loses skilled staff as well as funds used for their training. However, in case of re-emigration 
people gain foreign experience; they are trained through effective programmes and then use 
their experience in their own country. Thus, specialists improve their skills. The ﬁnancial status 
of families improves, and tension on the labour market reduces. 
Noting the prospects of export of labour for Belarus, specialists state that this will help 
the country integrate into the international labour market and will facilitate the future growth 
of investments to the Belarusian economy. The number of labour emigrants from Belarus is 
permanently increasing, going up almost three times since 1996. Currently, people go from Be-
larus to more than 20 countries of the world. Before 2000, the majority of them went to Russia. 
The emigration to USA has increase in the recent time. For example, in 2002, the number of 
people who left for USA on the basis of contracts was 1547. Two years later, this number was 
2026 persons. The relevant numbers of people going to Russia were 1147 and 916, respective-
ly. Mostly labourers go to Russia, for a long term. Basically, people under 24 leave Belarus. As 
a rule, they are students who are overwhelmingly employed at jobs demanding physical labour. 
The most common type of activities for Belarusian students abroad is seasonal agricultural 
work. The second place is services and leisure activities. It is known that Austria, Germany, 
France, Switzerland, Russia and USA have an increased demand for the so-called auxiliary 
staff, while in the construction sector, which has traditionally employed foreign labour, the rate 
of employment is dropping. 
Analysis of labour migration processes in Belarus indicated that, according to ofﬁcial 
data, the greatest number arrived to Belarus in 1998, i.e., 2969 persons. Later, this number 
started to decrease: to 1252 in 2003, and about 500 in 2005. They basically include citizens 
coming from Ukraine, Russian, Turkey, Bulgaria, Germany, China and Poland, who were em-
ployed in agriculture, construction, woodworking, trade and public meals sectors. Last year, 
about 160 persons were employed in jobs demanding mostly intellectual labour; of them, 30 
were managers, as a rule, of joint ventures and organizations with capital from their own coun-
tries. The Ministry of Internal Affairs records people coming to Belarus not only for work, but 
also as asylum seekers. 
BELARUS IS ATTRACTIVE FOR REFUGEES 
In early 1990’s, the inﬂow of forced migrants from other countries to Belarus increased. 
This can be explained by transparent borders, the geopolitical situation of the country, and its 
political and social stability. Belarus has created an integrated and effective system of legal and 
social protection. Legislation on refugees is implemented successfully; it meets requirements 
of international standards. Belarus acceded to the UN Convention of 1951 relating to refugees 
and the Protocol of 1967. Therefore, the country can be attractive for foreigners. Over 2001–
2004, about 600 foreigners arrived to Belarus asking for citizenship. As of 1 June 2005, 749 
persons were recognized refugees, of which 278 persons were under legal age. Basically, they 
are from countries of Central and South-East Asia and Africa. The absolute majority among 
them are Afghans and Ethiopians. With ﬁnancial support of the European Union, temporary 
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accommodation centres for illegal migrants are under construction near the airport Minsk-2 
and near Brest. 
Vadim Ignatenko. 12.01.06.
ALARMING PROSPECTS
Belarusian experts predict a growth of crimes related to corruption 
and an active development of shadow economy 
Corruption-related crime is characterized by a high latency and will be on the rise in 
the near future. This opinion is presented by specialists from the Institute of Criminology and 
Criminal Science of the Ministry of Justice of Belarus. According to criminal law experts, the 
statistical data of the last 10–12 years about corruption-related crimes demonstrate that this 
type of crime has a positive dynamics. This gives grounds to presume that future increase of 
corruption-related crimes would represent a stable trend, and it will be in place, at least, in the 
coming years. In 1992, there were about 2,700 crimes of this kind in Belarus; in 2004, this 
number was over 6,800. According to experts, today, the most common among them bribes, 
abuse of authority or ofﬁcial position, misappropriation or embezzlement. Also, they indicate 
that corruption-related crimes are very latent now due to their hidden nature and the close char-
acter of entities where this crime prospers. 
Speaking about the types of punishment adjudicated by Belarusian courts of law for 
these crimes, criminal law experts told that correctional labour is now the most common pun-
ishment, over 53%; though in 1992, less than 5% of suspects of corruption were sentenced for 
correctional labour. In the last two years, not more than 3% of suspects have been sentenced to 
pay ﬁnes, whereas in 1992 this type of punishment was used in relation to almost 32% of sus-
pects. In 1992, not a single sentence included punishment for corruption-related crimes repre-
sented by deprivation of the right to hold speciﬁc positions, while in the last year about 10% of 
suspects had this ruling. In the last 10 years, more lenient punishment adjudicated by courts of 
law, compared to what is stipulated in the law, has been more common. This judicial practice, 
at least, indicated to inadequacy of sentencing for the above crimes as compared to the scale of 
corruption-related crimes. According to experts, such practice does not help prevent crimes or 
enhance law and order and legality. 
At the background of corruption-related crimes as well as crimes in the ﬁeld of economy 
and ﬁnancial and credit sectors, there has been a boost of the shadow economy, by means of 
which criminal circles avoid paying taxes, legalize their incomes and use a signiﬁcant part of 
incomes to pay off corrupt ofﬁcials. This creates a vicious circle: the shadow economy nour-
ishes the criminal circles, which, in their turn, create a good ground for corruption and eco-
nomic crimes. 
According to data obtained during interview with ofﬁcers from law-enforcement, ﬁscal 
and judicial authorities, currently, corruption-related crimes are committed due to three main 
reasons: social and economic; moral; and related to underdeveloped criminal legislation. At 
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the same time, the surveys conducted among ofﬁcers of criminal justice and control authorities 
indicated that ordinary human greed is often the main factor facilitating corruption in Belarus. 
People inclined to obtain or extort bribes associate their life ideals with ﬁnancial concept of 
success and, when they take or demand bribes, they stem from the fact that power, money, pub-
lic status and ostentatious luxury play the main role in their life. 
According to interviews among ofﬁcers of prosecution departments, state security and 
police ofﬁcers, corruption is most widely spread among customs ofﬁcers, tax inspections and 
administrative authorities of regions, towns and districts. The second dozen of the most corrupt 
institutions, according to law-enforcement ofﬁcers, include banks, police, trade and communal 
service institutions, and health institutions. According to law-enforcement ofﬁcers, the three 
least corrupt institutions include the National Assembly, state security bodies and social sup-
port institutions. Interview among law-enforcement authorities working in this ﬁeld indicates 
that corrupt ofﬁcers receive bribes mostly in foreign currency; the second in rank is gifts and 
other material values; the third in rank is free of charge performance of construction and repair 
work; and the fourth in rank is immovable property, like ﬂats. 
According to experts, corruption-related actions, like placing of children to prestigious 
educational institutions, employment of relatives, promotion, sending to long-term business 
trips abroad, have become less popular in Belarus in the recent years. Results of analysis of 
questionnaires among law-enforcement ofﬁcers showed that information about corruption-re-
lated crimes is received by law-enforcement ofﬁces in the course of ﬁeld surveys and inquiry 
and from ﬁeld sources, as well as from individuals who contact law-enforcement authorities. 
About 26% of law-enforcement ofﬁcers who were enrolled into the interviews indicated 
that they themselves met with cases of pressure form state authorities and higher ofﬁcials ask-
ing them to neglect their ofﬁcial duties in the interests of corrupt state ofﬁcials. Over 6% of the 
respondents indicated that such pressure was exerted by the corrupt ofﬁcials or by their rela-
tives. Over 12% of the interviewed law-enforcement ofﬁcers reported that they were in situa-
tions when they were pressed because of investigation into corruption cases and were offered 
bribes; 7% met with cases when they were pressed through persuasion, and 3% indicated to 
being faced with threats. In general, according to the majority of the respondents from the law-
enforcement authorities, the ﬁght against corruption in Belarus is not at a proper level. 
FOR INFORMATION
Administrative burden on small and medium businesses in Belarus is among the heavi-
est in countries in transition. This conclusion was included into the survey «Business environ-
ment in Belarus» done by the International Financial Corporation (IFC), which also contained 
recommendations for the government of the country to develop small and medium business-
es. The survey indicates that as of 1 January 2005, there were 32,800 small enterprises and 
184,000 private entrepreneurs in Belarus. In 2004, the number of small enterprises went up 
by 6%, while the number of private entrepreneurs reduced by 1%. The total number of people 
employed by small and medium businesses is about 1 million, which makes 25% of economi-
cally active population of the country. 
WIDER EUROPE: 2005–2006
33
However, Belarus is signiﬁcantly lagging behind in its indicators of development of 
small and medium businesses, compared to other countries. Thus, Belarus has 3 small busi-
nesses per 1,000 persons; in Russia this indicator is 6, and in Tajikistan 5. As a result, the share 
of products manufactured by small enterprises makes in Belarus 9%, compared to 36% in Uz-
bekistan, 50% in France, and 54% in Sweden.
According to experts of the IFC, qualitative and quantitative growth of small and medi-
um businesses in Belarus is hindered by complicated administrative procedures and their high 
costs. During the survey among 1,200 Belarusian small enterprises and private entrepreneurs, 
organized in all regions of the country, the surveyors identiﬁed that the complexity of proce-
dures is explained, primarily, by a great number of required documents, the protracted proce-
dure and lack of clear interpretation of the requirements. This answer was given by 88% of 
the respondents from small and medium businesses. It was also identiﬁed that almost 70% of 
entrepreneurs think that personal relations and acquaintances are the best way to settle disputes 
with state authorities, and 64% of them indicated that unofﬁcial payments are the best solution. 
According to experts of the IFC, in 2004, small and medium businesses spent, on the average, 
$3,800 for registration, licensing and obtaining permits and certiﬁcations. In doing so, 17% of 
entrepreneurs indicated to forced unofﬁcial payments during administrative procedures. The 
average amount of bribes was $665. 
Analyzing the conditions for registration of small businesses, the authors of the sur-
vey indicated that two-thirds of all small businesses registered in 2004 called this procedure 
complicated. On the average, the registration process takes three months, and to do this, it is 
necessary to visit, at least, 10 organizations and collect 13 packages of documents. 80% of the 
small and medium businesses indicated that registration expenses are very high, making on the 
average $746. The high cost of registration is related to the fact that more than 80% of these 
expenses relate to notary certiﬁcation of the documents. 
Vadim Ignatenko. 09.02.06.
THE GREATEST FRIEND
Belarus is able, in some measure, to set off adverse implications of the 
ban on supplying the latest models of Western weapons developments 
to China
When making an ofﬁcial visit to China in early December of last year, President of Be-
larus Alexander Lukashenko had in advance announced the trip objectives through Belarusian 
and Chinese mass media. He declared that he intended to use the continuously growing poten-
tial of the People’s Republic of China as an «accelerator» for imparting new dynamics to the 
national economy of Belarus. The Belarusian President reiterated the same thesis when sum-
marizing the results of the Belarus-China summit in Beijing. To quote him, the major success 
of the visit can be clearly seen from over a dozen of signed interagency and intergovernmental 
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documents and by 20 negotiated contracts between economic agents of the two countries to the 
amount of USD 0.5 billion.
Belarus and China managed to expand the nomenclature of export deliveries. The ob-
jective is to increase mutual trade volume up to USD 2 billion. But it is most essential that 
Beijing conﬁrmed its willingness to accommodate Minsk with cheap loans for implementing 
concrete projects in the ﬁeld of telecommunications and high-end technologies. It is expected 
that the lending ceiling will be about USD 1 billion. As the Belarusian leader believes, «Some 
projects, which the Chinese side has asked to implement in Belarus, have no analogies in the 
world. China is willing to fund them and designates vast sums of money. Belarus will surely 
actualize these projects, since we have high-end technologies, science, and specialists. It is 
very important for us.» 
In order to understand what kinds of projects are in question, it is apparently necessary 
to pay attention to Alexander Lukashenko’s acknowledgement of China’s good progress in the 
ﬁeld of space exploration. But it is of most importance that China «hooked up» Belarusian 
enterprises and «hitched» them to develop space technologies. Thus, there appears a possibil-
ity to save Belarusian research schools. The degree of cooperation between the two countries 
in the space domain can supported by the evidence of an unprecedented move of the Chinese 
authorities — allowing the Belarusian delegation, headed by President Lukashekno, access to 
a most important strategic site of China, the Academy for Space Technology . In a word, the 
Belarusian leader recapped that «in the history of our nation there has been no case of a visit 
paying such substantial dividends». However, with regard to how Beijing expects to proﬁt 
from its rapprochement with Minsk, the interested party itself fails to provide an intelligible 
and clear answer.
BELARUS AND BEIJING’S PLANS
Answering this question instead of the rulers of the Heavenly Empire, some political 
analysts tend to see the reason behind the keen interest of gigantic China to Belarus, which is 
quite small in comparison to it, in the recently heightened full-ﬂedged super power claims of 
the People’s Republic of China. And, in the opinion of the Chinese government, this is impos-
sible without their country attaining proper military might and creating modern military forces 
that can be deployed abroad. So far, solving of this problem is hindered by the remaining back-
wardness of the Heavenly Empire in the ﬁeld of defense technologies compared to the most 
militarily advanced nations. The US impedes elimination of this gap in every possible way, 
prohibiting their allies to supply advanced weapons and break-though dual-use technologies to 
Beijing, as they are apprehensive of appearance of a real global competitor, though it may be 
in a long-term perspective. As for the near future, they are afraid of China’s attempts to occupy 
Taiwan. Nevertheless, Ivan Medeiros, analyst of Washington D.C.-based RAND Corporation, 
believes that China managed to make two achievements in the ﬁeld of military construction 
over a surprisingly short period of time. First, it concentrated its energy and resources to create 
an army within the army. Enormous monetary funds were allocated to create few high-technol-
ogy military units as part of the former 2.2-million People’s Liberation Army of China, which 
mainly consists of boot-wearing soldiers armed with riﬂes. The objective of these advanced 
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forces that make about 15% of the total PLA is to perform a time-urgent attack on weaker ad-
versaries, using destructive missile saturation, which is supposed to paralyze the enemy, and 
modern naval and air forces coordinated by means of high-technology communications and 
tactical control systems. Virtually all Western experts are conﬁdent that these new advanced 
military forces are created with a view to attack Taiwan.
As of today, China has more intercontinental ballistic missiles than before, a great vari-
ety of ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, and about 400 Russian-made jet ﬁghters SU-
27 and SU-30, designed both for gaining the air supremacy and hitting surface and sea targets 
with precision weapons. Beijing seeks to change from importing ﬁnished models to importing 
and adapting most advanced military and dual-use technologies. Therefore, American analysts 
regard China’s painful but successful steps toward creating a «defense industrial base,» i.e. its 
ability to produce modern weaponry, as «Achievement No. 2». 
But, as James Mulvenon of the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis believes, 
the genuine revolution made by the PLA in the ﬁeld of communications and military admin-
istration media is what impresses most. To quote him, within the life-span of one generation, 
they took a step from rags to the world of wireless technologies. And they are not going to call 
it a day, attracting the latest foreign R&D achievements on an increasingly larger scale.
DEBATE IN THE WEST
However, the PLA is hindered faces particular difﬁculties in re-equipment process due 
to the ban on weapon and military technology deliveries to China, which was imposed after 
the cruel massacre of the protesters at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Over 15 years has passed 
since then, and for at least ﬁve of them there has been an on-going struggle in the West, inten-
sifying and subsiding at intervals, for lifting the ban on supply of the latest armaments systems 
to China by NATO countries. At present, removal of this ban is opposed by rights advocates, 
who claim that China remains a repressive state, as well as by the Americans, who fear that the 
PLA gets hold of modern weapons through companies of states, possessing advanced military 
technologies, and may use them for attacking Taiwan. Removal of the ban is advocated pri-
marily by representatives of the European military industrial complex. In their opinion, such 
receptive and solvent markets as that of China are vitally important for Europe, which needs 
to create a top-notch armaments industry independent of the US. As for retaining the embargo 
on supplying latest military technologies to China, it is basically impossible in the long-term 
outlook. Those not available in Russia, a power friendly to the Chinese, quite possibly can be 
sold to them by Israel, which is privy to all military secrets.
ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE COMRADES
In view of the above, the overt attempts of China’s government to at least partially set off 
adverse implications of the ban on deliveries of the latest models of Western weapons develop-
ments by means of importing more or less advanced military and dual-purpose technologies 
from alternative sources appears quite reasonable. And, as suggested by evidence, Belarus by 
no means comes last in these designs.
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In response to statements by non-believers, who claim that Belarus is hardly able to pro-
vide to China equal quality substitutes for European and Israeli high technology products (all 
the more so that Moscow has long and successfully been taking advantage of the US embargo 
on weapons exports to China), we would like to cite the interview of September 4, 2005 given 
by Piotr Rogozhevski, ﬁrst deputy of the chair of the State Defense Industrial Committee of 
the RB, to Vo slavu Rodiny newspaper of the national Ministry of Defense. To quote him, the 
defense industrial complex of Belarus is ready to offer the following to potential partners: au-
tomated troop and weapons control systems; wire, ﬁber-optics, and radio communications sys-
tems for mobile and ﬁxed automated control systems; aerospace optoelectronic equipment and 
photogrammetric facilities for receiving digital electronic Earth surface maps and navigation 
support of precision weapons; application suites for control of radar, laser-optic and informa-
tion ballistic missile defense systems, missile warning stations, and space monitoring systems. 
It should be also noted here that military technology deliveries from the RB to China are in 
process and they did not commence as of yesterday. After the information publicized last year 
by General Chen Binde, head of the Ordnance Directorate of the PLA, Belarus and China had 
been successfully developing links in 126 lines of military technical cooperation over a period 
of almost 10 years. The completed contracts make a total of over USD 200 million.
However, our greatest friend’s sphere of interest is by no means limited to present-day 
achievements of Belarus. The Chinese counterparts develop an increasingly stronger interest 
in break-through R&D areas of tomorrow. As it appears from a recent piece of information by 
Sinhua Information Agency, a national base for R&D cooperation between China and Belarus, 
Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the former USSR was founded in the city of Chanchun 
in north-east Tziling province. It focuses on contacts in the ﬁelds of optoelectronics, materials 
science, biotechnologies, and other branches of research.
Some time earlier, a cooperation agreement was signed between the Belarusian State 
University and the Harbin Polytechnic Institute (HPI), pursuant to with the parties founded a 
Center for Scientiﬁc and Technological Cooperation for carrying out joint research and devel-
oping new technologies. To quote Zhao Zi, President of the HPI, cooperation with the BSU 
seeks to foster research at the Institute in such advanced areas as nano-technologies, laser 
technologies, etc.
Many analysts believe that the Chinese, who are famous for their pragmatism, are hardly 
interested in research for its own sake. Beijing needs its achievements primarily for creating 
dual-use and military technologies, including those in the ﬁeld of space exploration and rocket 
production. And Belarus, which is eager to secure a footing in China and attract Chinese in-
vestments, is willing in return to sell military technologies to that country.
PEACEFUL «BELKA»
At that, it is by no means impossible for Belarus and Russia to share with their Chinese 
brothers the beneﬁt of their joint project on creating space vehicles of «BelKA» type. Despite 
the fact that, following an inveterate Soviet tradition, the ofﬁcially publicized functions of the 
BelKa satellite look absolutely peaceful, it is certainly a dual-use vehicle, in accordance with 
the same traditional practice.
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It is expected that the satellite will be carried to the orbit from the Baikonur spaceport 
by means of the Dnepr launcher (converted version of the famous Satan missile) together with 
5–6 other satellites, which will allow for signiﬁcantly reducing the cost of the entire proj-
ect. Experts believe that the BelKA satellite will be possibly furnished with Belarusian-made 
polyzonal MK-4 equipment, designed to take photos of the Earth’s surface, as well as with a 
topographic camera TK-350, intended for receiving measuring photos from satellites used for 
drawing precise topographic maps and exploring the Earth’s natural resources. During the sat-
ellite ﬂight time, the camera provides photos of 25–30% of the total Earth’s surface with the 
positioning error of 10 m. 
According to the ofﬁcial version, the BelKA will be used mainly for receiving carto-
graphical, geological, and environmental information. For instance, up to 30% of all the in-
formation received from the satellite will be used for map-making, 20–25% — in agriculture 
and forest management, 10–15% — in geology, 15% — for environmental research, and 10% 
— for monitoring urbanization processes. At ﬁrst sight, such a ratio seems somewhat strange. 
Belarus is a small country and people have long traveled though its length and breadth. Why 
the so formidable need for cartographic information then? As a number of experts believe, 
the answer is quite simple: digital ground maps are used for directing precision weapons sys-
tems, for instance, cruise or aeroballistic missiles, to the target. As for receiving digital maps 
for missile guidance systems, they can be produced on the basis of aerial and space photos by 
the Automated Cartographic System for Creating, Upgrading, Storing, and Displaying Maps 
and Horizontal Plans in Digital and Graphic Form, created in Belarus. However, the list of 
high-end technologies, available in Belarus since the Soviet times, is by no means limited to 
the fore-quoted ones. It is another thing that ofﬁcial sources are in no hurry to publicize them.
Alexander Alesin. 13.02.06.
RUSSIA’S OUTPOST IN BELARUS
The space monitoring station, located in the territory of Belarus, may 
soon remain the only similar site situated outside of Russia
According to the statement by Sergey Ivanov, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Min-
ister of Defense, Russia will gradually abandon the missile warning system radars, owned by 
the RF, which are currently stationed in the territory of the countries of the former USSR. Nev-
ertheless, the command of the Gantsevichi-based radar station (Brest oblast) believe that op-
eration of the site named «Baranovichi Node» will be continued for sufﬁciently long time.
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
The Belarus-RF government-to-government agreement on the operation in Belarus of 
the missile warning system radar was signed in 1995 for the period of 25 years. In return for 
the operation of the radar, the armed forces of Belarus are entitled to conduct air defense exer-
cises with operational missile lauches at Russian training ranges. Pursuant to the same agree-
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ment, «the Gantsevichi-based military site of «Baranovichi Node» does not have a military 
base status and the number of military personnel at this site may not exceed 1,200 persons». 
The area of responsibility of the radar encompasses Germany, France, and Great Britain. The 
site of «Baranovichi» is served exclusively by the RF Military personnel, 250 of them being 
regular soldiers.
Specialists note that the Gantsevichi-based radar, commissioned after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, is the only Russian facility of the type, using fully digital signal processing. 
After the decommissioning of the Skrunde-based tracking facility (Latvia), the Baranovichi 
Node covered practically all of its area of responsibility. The military also declared that they 
were prepared to partially offset a possible loss of the radar in Mukachevo (Ukraine) by means 
of their capacities. At that, they regard the Mukachevo-based radar as a practically lost one, as 
this facility is manned exclusively by Ukrainian crews and all that Russia receives from this 
site is information on the outer space environment. According to the information received from 
an unaccredited source, the Mukachevo-based facility is frequented by NATO specialists, in 
particular, by the US military personnel.
When recently inspecting one of such facilities in Lekhtusi (Leningrad oblast), Sergey 
Ivanov, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, announced that sooner or 
later, as new highly compatible radar systems are created in the RF territory, Moscow will 
abandon the facilities that had been established under the Soviets and are currently situated 
in the territory of the New Independent States. At that, he noted that the priority strategic ori-
entation is southbound. To quote the Deputy Prime Minster, creation of the prototype model 
of the highly compatible radar system in Lekhtusi cost RUR 2 billion, and their cost upon the 
full production start-up will not exceed 1.5 mln. roubles. It used to take 5-9 years to construct 
similar facilities of the previous generation, while now it takes 1.5 years. Commissioning of 
new VHF and UHF radars in the north and south of Russia allows more time for warning of 
all missile launches, including short-range, combat, and cruise missiles along with interconti-
nental ballistic ones.
IMPORTANT NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE
While in the north the hazard of short-range and cruise missile attacks is highly unlikely, 
it is quite probable in the south. Commissioning of a new radar in the south of Russia will al-
low for eliminating dependency on the information arriving from the missile warning system 
facilities stationed in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Three RF radars are currently located in the ter-
ritory of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, along with two facilities in Ukraine.
RUSSIA WILL NOT ABANDON THE BELARUSIAN «VILEIKA»
In addition to the site of «Baranovichi», Belarus accommodates the radar facility of 
«Vileika» of the RR Navy. It is used for transmitting information for the Central Command of 
the Armed Forces of the RF and the Central Command of the Navy. In particular, the facility 
carries out reception of messages from submarines. The capabilities of the facility allow for 
receiving radio signals from a submarine, which is in the Atlantic Ocean at a depth of 200 me-
ters and from a submarine in the Paciﬁc Ocean 20 meters under the sea. Rear-Admiral Nikolai 
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Fetisov, head of the Central Radio Communications Center of the RF Navy, announced that in 
the near future Russia would not abandon the Belarus-based broadcasting facility of «Vileika.» 
He explained that more advanced radio communication techniques do not allow for fulﬁlling 
the missions that the Vileika-based facility is tasked with and noted that the broadcasting facil-
ity operates in a frequency band, which satellites fail to handle. This is a very low-frequency 
band (VLF) with the wave length of several kilometer.
The capacity of the broadcasting facility is 1 kWt and its communication range is up to 
10 thousand km. The maintenance area of the military unit, accommodating the facility, is over 
600 hectares. About 900 tons of antenna curtains is fastened to posts up to 320 meters high. 
The site commander reported that the facility would be upgraded within 3–4 years. It will be 
converted to a new element base, which is to enhance its capacity and reliability and reduce 
power consumption.
Leonid Semionov. 16.02.06.
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III. Regional context
MOST IMPORTANT VECTORS OF BELARUS’ POLITICS HAVE BEEN IDENTI-
FIED
The Belarusian parliament refused to mark down Russian as a strate-
gic partner of their country
Only 14 deputies voted for the proposal to make a corresponding entry into the law «On 
Approving the Fundamental Lines of Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Republic of Belar-
us», which was adopted on 5th October by the lower chamber of the National Assembly in the 
second (last) reading. 87 deputies opposed the proposal. The Chamber has 110 parliamentar-
ians altogether.
When approving the wording of the new legislative act clause-by-clause, some deputies 
proposed to complement the clause on the fundamental objectives of Belarus’ foreign policy 
with the following statement: «Development of strategic partnership with the Russian Federa-
tion pursuant to the Treaty on the Formation of a Union State of 8th December 1999.» Taking 
the ﬂoor to validate the proposal, Ms. Abramova, who is considered chief representative of 
Russia’s Yabloko Party in Belarus, provided the following justiﬁcation for the initiative:
«We believe that strategic partnership between Belarus and Russia is not a variable; it is 
a constant, a baseline value. And this is not only because we have a union treaty with Russia 
and do not have any with other foreign states. This should be anchored in the fundamental ob-
jectives for a single reason that Russia is our leading economic partner with a receptive market 
for our goods, as can be seen from the sales dynamics over the many years of this country’s 
independence. And this is not only because the RF side always supports Belarus in foreign 
policy directions. I would like to remind you, dear colleagues, of the speech made by President 
of Belarus at the 60th session of the UN General Assembly. The political meaning, as they say 
now, of the Belarusian President’s message to the international community lay in an appeal 
to respect a people’s right to choose its own way of development. The political meaning for a 
single particular addressee was quite concrete — President of Belarus actually stated that what 
had happened to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq could not and should not happen to Belarus 
under any circumstances. There are at least three reasons to this: ﬁrst, in Belarus there are no 
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formal causes for external intervention in a concentrated form, as this country does not have 
internal conﬂicts on inter-ethnic or inter-denominational grounds; second, no one can create in 
this country an externally driven conﬂict that could provide such a cause. And, third, we are in 
union with Russia — a great friendly nation.» The deputy said, «I would like to add a personal 
comment that it is the latter that almost entirely rules out the scenario of Yugoslavia or other 
variant of any foreign intervention. Even if someone already does not like the future actual re-
sults of the presidential election of 2006 at the forecast level. I am asking for your support of 
the amendment.»
But this appeal did not inspire Olga Abramova’s fellow parliamentarians. Anatoli Kra-
sutski, deputy chair of the parliamentary committee for international affairs and liaisons with 
the New Independent States, who was presenting the draft law, opposed these arguments with 
some of his own:
«First, the level of the policy law does not imply such concrete deﬁnitions, which is 
indicated by the generalized wording of its provisions. Otherwise, such a fundamental prin-
ciple of a regulatory legal act as stability will be violated. Second, the peculiarities of relations 
between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation are well-known and have their 
political, economic, and legal basis, which is signiﬁcantly broader than the cited treaty. Third, 
presence of a reference to a particular legal act will call for constant introduction of amend-
ments into the policy law in the event of amendment or abolition of this treaty or appearance 
of a new legal act regulating the relations between the two states, in particular, for instance, 
a Constitutional Act of the Union State. In other words, the law will become dependent on 
concrete circumstances of development of relations between the Republic of Belarus and the 
Russian Federation. Fourth, anchoring the tenet of development of strategic partnership with 
a single particular country in the law runs counter to the principle of our multi-vector foreign 
policy, proclaimed by the Republic of Belarus, which was once again openly reiterated by the 
President of this country in his recent speech in the UNO. Considering the dynamism and con-
crete forms of Belarus’ cooperation within other alliances in the post-Soviet realm, it seems 
inexpedient to anchor provisions for development of integration processes with regard to only 
one state in a policy law.» 
After that one would have the impression that the deputies became prostrate. On the one 
hand, they had heard so much of strategic partnership with Russia from Alexander Lukash-
enko that it was difﬁcult for them to understand the point of waiving this provision. On the 
other hand, Belarusian deputies, by virtue of their election speciﬁcs, are extremely obedient to 
their superiors. And the latter did not approve of the amendment. Hence the above-cited vot-
ing results.
Evaluating them, Andrey Sannikov, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Be-
larus, accentuated three points:
«The vote has once again conﬁrmed that amendments, which have not been coordinated 
with the administration, do not get adopted even if they are extrinsically in line with the ad-
ministration’s policy. Second, this bears evidence to the existence of Russian lobby in Belarus, 
which operates through some deputies and seeks to link Belarus to Russia still more, not only 
through Lukashenko but also by means of such provisions in most essential documents. And, 
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lastly, let us not be concerned with Belarus at the moment. But in case a similar clause appears 
in any country’s strategy, it is indicative only of its unilateral orientation and cooperation only 
with one country or party.»
Sergey Martynov, current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, is of a different opin-
ion. According to him, the law «On Approving the Fundamental Lines of Domestic and For-
eign Policy of the Republic of Belarus» is adopted «forever» and should not be changed. The 
Minister noted that the draft law is of a «framework, conceptual nature» and, «by deﬁnition, 
should not contain deﬁnitized tenets.» In particular, it may not reﬂect the prospects of Belarus’ 
interaction with concrete nations, including Russia. According to him, this document will be 
given «practical contents» in the course of the foreign-policy line, pursued by the government 
of this country.
Some Belarusian experts are not prone to dramatizing the refusal of the deputies of the 
lower chamber to enter the provision of strategic partnership with Russia in the policy docu-
ment. They believe there is no need to introduce the clause about Russia in the national legisla-
tion. Indeed, the union with Russia (or orientation towards it) was anchored at the referendum 
long ago (the referendum of May 1995 is meant). It is implemented in the framework of inter-
governmental regulations. And in general, it seems somewhat surprising that the proposal put 
forward by some deputies was not coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Among Belarus’ foreign policy objectives, which made part of the new law, there is on 
of «gaining a neutral status». Belarus is known to ofﬁcially steer for neutrality. For instance, 
in the current Constitution (Article 18) it is recorded that «… the Republic of Belarus aims at 
making its territory a nuclear-free zone and its state a neutral one.»
How can membership in an international military organization (Collective Security 
Treaty Organization — CSTO) go together with a neutral policy? In his time, Stanislav Shush-
kevich, speaker of the Belarusian parliament, for a long time resisted Belarus’ entry into this 
newly created organization, precisely for the reason that, in his opinion, neutrality and the 
(CSTO) are incompatible. But in the early 1990s the majority of the deputies, on the initia-
tive of the pro-government group of «Belarus», brought the corresponding resolution through 
the Supreme Council and virtually forced Shushkevich to endorse the document developed in 
Tashkent.
However, Yelena Gritsenko, head of department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Belarus, is of a different opinion:
«I do not think there is a contradiction here. The CSTO is the only organization in the 
territory of the NIS that aims to defend the interests of the CSTO member-countries. This does 
not run counter to neutral status for, in the absence of a threat, the organization’s functions 
encompass only information exchange and taking measures with respect to the problems that 
may represent a potential hazard. Neither the by-laws of the CSTO nor its position embed ag-
gressiveness, which would run counter to the neutral state status of each of the member-coun-
tries.»
The opinion of Mecheslav Grib, another former head of the Belarusian parliament, is 
quite noteworthy. By the way, at the time of the CSTO creation he headed the parliamentary 
committee for national security, defense, and crime control. At that time he was one of Stan-
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islav Shushkevich’s most ardent opponents and believed that Belarus needed to join the CSTO 
as a defense-only organization. However, at present he thinks somewhat differently:
«At large, these two lines (neutrality and the CSTO membership) are incompatible be-
cause we should remain neutral with respect to all nations. At present no one threatens us or 
claims our territory. Therefore, we should stick to neutrality and not join anyone. As for the 
CSTO, when this Treaty was signed, it was meant that this organization is of defense-only na-
ture. But if someone attacks one of the Treaty member-countries, the rest of the CSTO nations 
must help it. How will it be reconciled with neutral status then? It will not. So much for the de-
fense nature of the CSTO! This has nothing to do with neutrality. The international community 
will not accept or understand such neutrality.»
This law, as deputy Krasutski noted, was adopted «for the ﬁrst time in the life of this 
country and in the history of the Belarusian parliamentary system.» In the deputy’s opinion, 
«this is quite consistent, as the Belarusian development model proved its viability in the realm 
of the NIS». Moreover, he claimed that none of the NIS countries, including the Russian Fed-
eration, had got such a document so far.
The new law identiﬁes most important vectors of the State’s activities. In accordance 
with this regulatory act, this country will structure its foreign and domestic policies for the 
future. The document has been developed on the basis of the Constitution and consists of two 
sections. The ﬁrst one identiﬁes domestic policy spheres. In the ﬁeld of economics, the stra-
tegic objective is deﬁned as establishing an effective socially-oriented market economy. The 
need for activization of investment and innovation operations is emphasized. The domestic 
policy of Belarus is based upon the principles of stability of the constitutional system, secured 
rights and liberties of citizens, equality of all forms of ownership, and social justice. The draft 
law reﬂects budget and ﬁnance, taxation, monetary, and foreign exchange policies. There have 
appeared new standards concerning investment and structural policy, healthcare, art, and hous-
ing relations. The second section records long-term foreign-policy orientation. It is built on the 
principles of enhancing the effectiveness of instruments of state sovereignty protection, vol-
untary entry into and participation in intergovernmental formations. Emphasis is laid on the 
importance of international cooperation and interaction in the space ﬁeld. The foreign policy 
priorities now include such areas as education and tourism.
Vladimir Glod. 10.10.05.
REACTION TO DEMOCRATIC CHOICE
While Moscow is having a gripe session with Kiev by means of «gas 
diplomacy», the allied Minsk is attempting to uncoil another spiral of 
tension with Warsaw
Aggravation of relations between Moscow and Kiev concurrently with the enunciation 
of the Democratic Choice Commonwealth does not appear a simple coincidence. It was joined 
by Russia’s neighboring countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The idea of the new Com-
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monwealth was perceived to be anti-Russian and as an alternative to the NIS, where Moscow 
attempts to dominate. And, on the whole, the Kremlin is known to have taken the triumph of 
the Orange Revolution as its own defeat, while its Belarusian ally saw it as a threat to its sover-
eignty. Judging by the work of the state propaganda apparatus and politicians’ statements, we 
are still a long way from establishing normal Belarus-Ukraine contacts at the high and supreme 
levels. Apparently, with regard to the commitments on coordinating foreign policies of the two 
parts of the virtual union state, ofﬁcial Minsk took the baton from Moscow to «construct» re-
lations with Warsaw.
The rulers of Belarus did not expect the results of the parliamentary and presidential 
election in the neighboring Poland, which took place in the fall, to be of any good for them-
selves; even when Self Defense Party, whose leader Lepper used to be a guest at Lukashenko’s 
residence, joined the coalition with the winning Law and Justice Party. With regard to the Be-
larusian leader, there is a consensus of opinion among the Polish establishment. Therefore, the 
ruler can hardly hear any nice personalias from Warsaw, especially after the scandalous disper-
sal of the administrative body of the Union of the Poles, one of the largest NGOs of Belarus. 
Belarusian authorities do not need independent NGOs. Moreover, they regard them as a haz-
ard, especially with regard to the experience of the driving forces of the Ukrainian revolution.
The embassies of Belarus and Poland in the capitals of both countries are currently al-
most «exsanguinated». Following a series of reciprocal renvois of diplomats on the eye-for-
eye principle, the personnel of the two neighbors’ diplomatic missions was reduced to uncus-
tomary minimum. Minsk lost the Polish Ambassador, who resigned because of accusations of 
being unable to improve advocacy of Poland’s interests. It may be said that, in view of these 
interests, Warsaw has lately started to undertake certain steps to remedy the abnormal situ-
ation. For example, it has recently applied to the Belarusian MFA with a request to accredit 
another staff member — the fourth military man in the Polish Embassy. The Belarusian Em-
bassy in Warsaw has only one military diplomat. Minsk is unlikely to take such an imbalance 
positively. 
The situation with appointing a new Poland’s ambassador to Belarus does not seem quite 
clear either. After unofﬁcial information, among the candidates there is former Polish ambas-
sador to Ukraine Marek Ziolkowski, who worked in Minsk in the 1990s. But the most likely 
candidate to become a new ambassador may be National Security Bureau chief Jerzy Bar. He 
is also familiar to the Belarusian side after the conducted meetings with Gennadi Nevyglas, 
State Secretary of the RB Security Council, and tri-lateral contacts, with the involvement of 
Ukraine, on the issues of border cooperation. However, in view of the planned new appoint-
ments to Minsk, attention is drawn to the fact that after Stefan Meller had been transferred 
from Moscow, where he was ambassador, it is his former subordinates who became candidates 
for positions in Minsk, including the above-mentioned military diplomat and another candi-
date ambassador to Belarus. The Minister’s bent for his staff members is generally understood. 
It is most essential that, if they get selected, they should be able to quickly adjust to the Belaru-
sian reality. And this reality is very different to that of Moscow. In the coming year Belarus is 
expecting an important event — a presidential election. And Poland’s diplomatic mission in 
Belarus, as well as missions of other EU countries, will operate under very difﬁcult conditions. 
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The developments in relations between Minsk and Warsaw, which have been observed in the 
recent days, bear evidence to that.
Belarusian Ambassador to Poland Pavel Latushko was summoned to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Poland. He was received by Wojciech Zainczykowski, Deputy Head of Eu-
rope Department. The Polish MFA demanded explanations from the Belarusian Ambassador 
with respect to the refusal of Belarusian border guards to allow entry to Belarus to Michal 
Dvorczik, Councilor to Prime Minister of Poland Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. Belarusian border 
guards said he «was a persona non grata in the territory of the Republic of Belarus». Accord-
ing to Pavel Dobrovolski, Polish Foreign Ministry Spokesman, this incident is unacceptable 
in the relations between two European states. He also noted that «the Ministry took notice of 
the explanations provided by the Belarusian Ambassador». «I cannot say that Poland-Belarus 
relations can qualify as good,» Mr. Dobrowolski said.
We can add to this story that on 13th December Agniezka Romaszewska, correspondent 
of the Polish Public TV (TVP) was detained in Minsk-2 airport by Belarusian border guards. 
According to TVP, Romaszewska was refused entry to Belarus. She was explained that she 
would not be allowed into the country on the basis of the law regulating foreign nationals’ stay 
in Belarus. Meanwhile, as they emphasized at the TV company, Romaszewska has ofﬁcial ac-
creditation as a permanent correspondent, issued by the MFA of Belarus.
The events that took place in Belarusian–Polish relations during the last days of the end-
ing year are indicative of the twisting of a new spiral of tension. And, regardless of the deﬁant 
condescension attitude of Lukashenko’s statements on the forum of the Democratic Choice 
Commonwealth that took place in Kiev (in his opinion, such a commonwealth does not have a 
future), the current behavior of ofﬁcial Minsk toward its neighbors can be with a high degree 
of probability regarded as a nervous reaction to the democratic choice they made.
Roman Yakovlevsky. 15.12.05.
WASHINGTON’S WARNING
The US Government and European partners may take a number of 
possible resolutions and steps in their approach to Belarus
At a special meeting with a group of journalists invited to the US Embassy in Minsk, 
George Krol, US Ambassador to Belarus, conﬁrmed that facilitation of democracy develop-
ment remained the long-term policy of the US with respect to Belarus. In this context, the 
Belarus Democracy Act, unanimously passed by the US Congress last year, is of importance. 
There is a range of possible resolutions and step, Ambassador Krol emphasized, which the US 
Government and European partners might take in their approach to Belarus. To quote him, 
these potential resolutions and steps are being actively reviewed by the Government of the 
United States. For instance, the report on the accounts and property owned by the Belarusian 
leaders, envisaged in the Democracy Act, remains at the stage of preparation with the US gov-
ernment machinery.
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It should be noted that the US Congress for the ﬁrst time in history passed a special law 
on Belarus. American legislators were pushed to take such a decision by the consistent policy 
that the Belarusian ruler had been pursuing for 11 years. In the opinion of the world commu-
nity, the baseline principles of this policy run counter to the generally accepted norms and 
standards. If previously these contradictions had been successively recorded by national par-
liaments of European nations, the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and 
the European Union, now the subject was brought before the UN, where a position of special 
spokesperson for Belarus was established. Over the past year, active critics of Lukashenko 
regime have been joined by Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. The object of this criticism has 
been known to respond by intensifying oppressive measures with regard to the opposition, 
NGOs, and mass media. The world community began to pressurize and criticize Moscow, 
which continues defend Lukashenko internationally and provide ﬁnancial and material assis-
tance to him. As many politicians and analysts believe, the opponents of the ruling circles are 
losing hope that the Kremlin will put the heat on Lukashenko with the purpose of democratiz-
ing Belarus. From the standpoint of several observers, the reforming of the government and 
strengthening of control over mass media that are currently taking place in Russia, is by no 
means an illustration of democracy. They also note the synchronism of anti-American propa-
ganda campaigns observed in Russian and Belarusian mass media, especially on state-owned 
TV channels. And Belarus does not have any other kind of TV.
Ambassador Krol told the journalists that in view of the massive campaign launched 
by the Belarusian TV, which demonstrates hatred of extraordinary intensity for the American 
people, the US Embassy in Minsk was forced to impart to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Belarus its apprehension of the «anti-American campaign in the state-owned mass media.» 
Such a position of the Belarusian authorities casts the relations between the two countries back 
to the worst cold war times.
Mr. Krol said that the United States interestedly observes the preparation in Belarus for 
the election campaign of 2006. The Ambassador noted that the Belarusian opposition is still 
separated from the Belarusian community by means of a media blockade. Belarusian citizens 
do not have free access to information and there is no free exchange of opinions, which is nec-
essary for a free election process. This very much disturbs the world community and brings 
into a question if the 2006 election is going to be free, fair, and democratic. «Democratic elec-
tion in Belarus is under threat,» US Ambassador George Krol stated.
Roman Yakovlevsky. 17.11.05.
BELARUS’ MISSION
In 2006 Belarus intends to lead the process of collecting the lands of 
the former Soviet empire
Acknowledgement of the disintegration of the post-Soviet realm as historically inevi-
table by some of its entities is being postponed again, despite the recent trends. On the oppo-
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site, some are still nursing schemes to turn back this process. In 2006 Belarus intends to lead 
the crusade for collecting the lands from Brest to Vladivostok. It is already known that, ﬁrst, 
it has been tasked with organizing the anniversary summit of the NIS; second, it is going take 
the chair in the EvrAzES (Eurasian Economic Community); and, third, its turn to preside in the 
CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) is approaching.
The beginning of this year turned out to be exceedingly scandalous in the family of 
the former Soviet republics. Russia’s «gas attack» on Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Mol-
dova caused them to burst with indignation with respect to the «big brother’s» behavior and 
make sounding declarations of permanent alienation with Moscow as a center for uniﬁcation 
processes in the post-Soviet realm. Their rather expressive negative attitude toward Belarus, 
which Moscow charged the old price for gas, allegedly for its «model behavior», was just as 
natural.
There is no doubt that both participants of this «gas war» and the remaining members of 
post-Soviet formations, such as the NIS, the EvrAzES, the CSTO, and the EEP (Uniform Eco-
nomic Space), will not be able to free themselves from these feelings and emotions in the near 
months, or maybe even years. But they will never change their geographical coordinates with 
respect to Moscow. In general, the wounds received in that bickering are still green. Along with 
that, demonstrations of peaceful initiatives are inevitable. One of them is already known to be 
brought forward by Belarus in the current year. 
The issues of the national policy in multilateral integration associations in the post-So-
viet realm made the topic of a special meeting conducted by President Alexander Lukashen-
ko. To quote him, Belarus is to accomplish «important tasks» in the framework of its current 
chairmanship in the EvrAzES and forthcoming chairmanship in the CSTO. «There are more 
than enough problems there and all heads of states are waiting to see what Belarus is going to 
do during its chairmanship in these organizations», Lukashenko noted. He demanded from his 
company to identify the scope of Belarusian initiatives for the forthcoming summits, «We need 
to introduce such proposals, which would give a nudge to the integration processes, reviviﬁed 
them in some aspects and could just remedy the situation in other aspects.»
Sergey Martynov, Minister of Foreign Affair, who spoke in the meeting, pronounced the 
need for deﬁning functions of the NIS in various ﬁelds with more precision. «It is necessary to 
enhance interaction in the spheres of combating terrorism and human trafﬁcking and suppres-
sion of drug trafﬁcking,» the head of the Foreign Service pointed out. He also spoke in favor 
of intensifying social and humanitarian cooperation.
Pointing out the strategic position of the EvrAzES member-countries in Eurasia and the 
substantial economic potential of the Community, Sergey Martynov did not rule out the possi-
bility of giving this organization some political functions. To quote the Minister, the Belarusian 
side has prepared initiatives on development of the EvrAzES, which are drawn in the form of 
President’s of Belarus Address to his colleagues.
Sergey Martynov named the main objective of the CSTO to be integration of the Organi-
zation into the international security architecture. To quote him, we need to achieve the interna-
tional acknowledgement of this organization as an equal partner to other security structures.
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Sergey Martynov brought forward a proposal for all concerned ministries and agencies 
to promptly and clearly formulate what they suggest for and look forward to gain from par-
ticipation in the NIS, the Eurasian Economic Community, and the Collective Defense Treaty 
Organization. On the basis of these suggestions it is intended to develop and adopt President’s 
directives on each of these integration formations. 
President of Belarus also declared his personal standpoint at this meeting: it involves 
retaining and developing of the «broad» NIS in the 12-state format along with simultaneous 
strengthening of regional integration associations. «Lately there has been much criticism of 
the NIS, alleging that it is a mechanism for «civilized divorce» rather than integration of na-
tions and that we will never reach the EU level. The positive role of the NIS is even further 
disclaimed by leaders of some countries, who try to earn a reputation with their foreign patrons 
by means of slogans of separation from the NIS. I means such associations as GUAM (the 
union of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), the so-called Democratic Choice Com-
munity,» the Belarusian leader said.
To put it mildly, there are serious doubts that Lukashenko is going to succeed in «bring-
ing to reason» the GUAM and DCC leaders, especially Yushchenko and Saakashvili, persuad-
ing them to abandon the «non-indigenous» neoformations in favor of the good old NIS order. 
Last year dictator Lukashenko and revolutionaries Yushchenko and Saakashvili «the» more 
than once displayed their mutual disaffection. On the other hand, it seems that the Belarusian 
leader hardly believes himself in such «rehabilitation» of his colleagues. As Yuschenko has 
been declaring, Ukraine is deﬁnitely not going to closely integrate with its former USSR «rela-
tives» in the prejudice of the European vector.
Judging by Lukashenko’s statements, Belarus none the less intends to focus its lead-
ing mission on integration of the post-Soviet realm within the structures where there are no 
«revolutionaries» and their inﬂuence, primarily in the EvrAzES. «We, as presiding party, do 
not have the right even to think that the EvrAzES should keep on «dying away». We are pon-
dering on initiatives that could boost work. It all quite simple: we need to solve two or three 
major issues, which will be of interest and keep the states in the EvrAzES,» Belarusian Presi-
dent is convinced.
As such issues Lukashenko regards those of railway tariffs and custom union creation, 
«If Russia is unable to supply everyone with natural gas and oil, these natural resources are 
available in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Russia should not impede supply of 
hydrocarbon, say, to Belarus or Ukraine». In his opinion, settling of these problems will en-
hance attractiveness of the EvrAzEs.
At present a message from the chair of the EvrAzES Intergovernmental Council to the 
heads of its member-states is being prepared. To quote Lukashenko, at the forthcoming EvrAz-
ES summit in St. Petersburg Belarus is going to bring forward «concrete proposals» for study-
ing. «If the heads of states agree to them, we will move in this direction. This is rapproche-
ment-oriented motion,» the Belarusian President believes.
Lukashenko explains his strive for integration and strong concern about the situation in 
the post-Soviet realm by the need to resist the adversaries in the name of the US and the EU, 
apart from everything else. However, it is necessary to understand that it is actually closely 
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linked to the presidential election in Belarus. The Belarusian leader once again lets both all his 
friends and foes abroad and his fellow countrymen see that absolutely nothing will change here 
after 19th March. Maybe it will not, indeed. But another thing is also true: after this date the 
ofﬁcial Minsk will deﬁnitely have less desire to make a fuss about integration.
Mikhail Dashuk. 19.01.06.
RUSSIAN BEETLE AND EUROPEAN BLOCK
Europe has never been in such consensus with regard to Belarus
The observers are unanimous: during the past weeks Europe displayed unprecedented 
fervency, or even ostentation, in tackling the «Belarusian issue». The degree of interest in this 
issue is rising as 19th March is approaching – the date of the presidential election in the coun-
try with a consistent reputation of the «last dictatorship in Europe.» At that, unprecedented at-
tention is paid to contacts with top oppositionists. Alexander Milinkevich, a potential rival to 
the irremovable President Lukashenko, was given the green light to make an impressive tour 
of the Old World’s political centers. After the New Year Milinkevich managed to meet Phillip 
Dust-Blazi, Foreign Minister of France, Polish President Lech Kaczynski, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, and other EU 
leaders. A bit earlier he had met Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. The leader of the Be-
larusian opposition also was given the ﬂoor in Poland’s Seim, the European Parliament, and 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and, in addition, spoke at a series of im-
portant international forums and informal executive meetings. This is truly an unprecedented 
thing. None of the political opponents of the system had been honored with such a cascade of 
receptions in the Old World capitals. And this looks especially spectacular against the back-
ground of blind confrontation between the ofﬁcial Minsk and the West, whereupon President 
Lukashenko has not been invited to Europe for a long time.
In the meantime, harsher overtones have sounded in declarations made by European 
bodies on the «Belarusian issue». This concerns both assessments of the state policy and pos-
sible measures of retaliation to be applied to the top ofﬁcials in the event of failing to ensure a 
fair election. Europe is preparing to make a massed lodgment of observers. Besides, Brussels 
accelerated the startup of a large project on independent broadcasting on Belarus. The leader of 
the Belarusian opposition himself thinks that «Europe has never been in such consensus with 
regard to Belarus.» Hot on the trail after his voyage through the Old World capitals, Alexander 
Milinkevich gave an interview to «Wider Europe» portal.
Summarizing the results of your tour – what is in the «dry residue»?
А.М. «It is of the greatest importance that Europe has seen a clear democratic perspec-
tive in Belarus and is willing to actively assist it as never before. Previously they took different 
positions with regard to the Belarusian issue over there. Some said that maybe he should not 
be messed with at all; if Belarusians love their president so much, let their society mature to 
democracy. Others advocated a very hard approach. At present, as I became convinced at my 
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meetings, practically the entire Europe has the same standpoint. It cannot leave this country in 
a grave, undemocratic condition.
«First of all, we border on the European Union. And a dictatorship is always unstable, 
unpredictable, and aggressive. Second, along with concern about its own security, Europe also 
feels morally indebted. Human rights, democracy, election in full compliance with the law 
— these are no idle words for the Europeans. I made sure: it is not true that Belarus allegedly 
is not welcome to Europe. I could see that during the meeting with our delegation foreign poli-
ticians had their eyes light up. They began to feel that Belarus is not such a bog of pessimism, 
as some of them had believed. They found that we have a strong and energetic alternative to 
the current power.»
Ofﬁcial Minsk claims that Europe is allegedly not burning with desire to butt in the Be-
larusian affairs, but is pushed by Washington… How would you comment on that?
А.М. «Any attempts to drive a wedge between Washington’s and Brussels’ positions 
concerning the «Belarusian issue» are hopeless. At present it is a single position. This is what 
the joint visit of high-rank US and EU representatives to Minsk was supposed to demonstrate. 
The Belarusian ofﬁcials followed their ritual, refusing to issue them visas at the same time. 
As a result, Washington and Brussels jointly refused to visit, thus conﬁrming their uniﬁed ap-
proach.»
Along with that, there is an opinion that Europe does not want to confront Russia be-
cause of Belarus…
А.М. «Naturally, Europe does not need confrontation with Moscow. It is very soothing 
for Europe when we persuade them that the Belarusian democratic movement is absolutely 
not anti-Russian; when we say that we are capable of building more honest, transparent, and 
predictable relations with Russia than the current establishment. Yes, we emphasize that in-
dependence is a holy thing for us. But it is exactly on the ground of independence that we can 
both take our relations with Russia to a new level and build relations with Europe from ground 
zero.»
There prevails an opinion that, despite all their good intentions, Western nations sim-
ply do not have effectual mechanisms to inﬂuence the situation in Belarus. Do you agree with 
that?
А.М. «Certainly, one can throw many such stones… But the «fault» of the uniﬁed Eu-
rope is limited, perhaps, only to its being democratic for a long time and has unlearned to 
«handle» dictarorships. Therefore, it is indeed necessary to seek effectual mechanisms. After 
all, if the Belarusian authorities are unwilling to cooperate and brush aside all proposals, it is 
their problem. But at the same time this country has a civil community, mass media, parties, 
trade unions… It is they who should be closely cooperated with, and we accentuated this in our 
discussions all the time. We were persuading them, for instance, that it would be worthwhile to 
provide an easier visa issue policy for Belarusians. By the way, some European parliamentar-
ians took up the idea and took it further, speaking of issue of visas free of charge. Naturally, 
this is a complicated problem and it cannot be solved in a day. Just making visas cheaper will 
be a success. The more average Belarusians are able to see with their own eyes how Europe 
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lives and what it is inspired by, the more our society will be convinced that the current authori-
ties retarded and suspended this country’s development.»
The ofﬁcial Belarusian propaganda claims that opposition leaders arrange their per-
sonal business abroad. They allegedly prepare alternate landing sites for themselves over 
there and soon they will surely escape, exposing their naïve rank-and-ﬁle supporters…
А.М. «While traveling around the country, I have more than once announced to our fel-
low citizens that we united for real and for long. Until the complete victory of democracy. I 
mean our coalition, which last fall conducted the Congress of the Democratic Forces in Minsk. 
And I, as a leader elected by the Congress, am not going anywhere. I have a settled intention to 
work in Belarus under any political climate – not to seek refuge in the West, but do everything 
to create decent standards of living for all Belarusians in our common home. So that my fellow 
countrymen, my children and grandchildren would live in a prosperous and free country.»
And still, not to mince words — what can your international activity give to your country 
and its average citizens?
А.М. «Educated and active young Belarusians understand that it is impossible to im-
prove prosperity of their homeland without cooperation with the community of democratic na-
tions. Let me reiterate myself: they are ready to open a door for us. In the event of democratic 
changes, Belarus will receive investments and new technologies. New modern plants will be 
built and new jobs will be created. Belarus will be transformed! Currently we are closed. Fear 
reigns in the society. Performance ﬁgures are achieved by means of a whip. We will destroy 
this atmosphere of fear. Belarusians are fully entitled to a decent life.»
During meetings in Strasburg, Brussels, and other political centers of the Old World you 
accentuated the issue of assistance to non-governmental mass media and independent aware-
ness-building among your countrymen. What are the motives behind this?
А.М. «It is because of the information blockade in our society that fear and apathy be-
came so wide-spread. We are grateful to Europe for its willingness to help us break through this 
blank wall. In the course of discussions, our delegation emphasized that such assistance should 
be provided in a number of lines. It is important to pay attention not only to organization of TV 
and radio broadcasting from abroad, but also to help those who deal with independent aware-
ness-building within this country, which is anything but simple. Over here, in spite of the hor-
rendous pressure, there are still newspapers that courageously ﬁght for truth. They should be 
supported in every way. The Internet is becoming an increasingly important means of commu-
nication, especially for the young. Thus, radio and television are certainly quite signiﬁcant, but 
it is also of importance that such projects should not become something like a fashion and not 
shadow other areas. In general, provision of free information to the Belarusian society calls for 
an integrated approach.»
Do you believe that the European Union launches media projects for Belarus for real 
and for long, and not just to «tick it off,» as Brussels’ critics claim?
А.М. «I am absolutely sure of this. One hundred percent sure, since I have had substan-
tive discussions on this point and seen a number of documents with my own eyes.»
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What is your action program for the culminating point of the election campaign, consid-
ering the forecasts by independent experts that the authorities will rigidly stick to its scenario, 
with the ofﬁcial leader taking the game with a «smashing score»?
А.М. «We are not going to play by the script of the authorities. It is clear that they on 
high are preparing to announce unconditional victory of the current leader. But we are placing 
our stake on people’s intelligence, common sense, and courage. I am sure that on the Election 
Day the society will clearly realize that this power has completely lost its authority. And even 
its proponents will feel that this system is not worth supporting».
Thus, you do not think that, as pessimists keep saying, «the score of the match is already 
known»?
А.М. «If I had not traveled the length and breadth of this country, I possibly would not 
have become so convinced that we have accumulated a tremendous potential for change. I am 
absolutely sure that we are able to get over 50 percent of the vote. The most important thing is 
for people to clearly understand that this victory has been achieved, that we have won. This is 
what we preparing ground for. In case the authorities announce the results that are contrary to 
people’s will, the worse for them. This will mark the beginning of the end of this system».
***
So, Brussels have activated its politics at the Belarusian front. Along with that, observ-
ers note that the leader of the Belarusian opposition, inspired by the results of his busy trip, 
may somewhat exaggerate the degree of unanimity and activeness of Europe with respect to 
promoting democratization of his country. In the opinion of critics, the recent PACE resolu-
tion on the Belarusian issue once again abounds in generalizations. And the speciﬁcs, such as 
threats to expand the «black list» of Lukashenko’s ofﬁcials, who are not going to be allowed 
in the West, do not look overly scary to the top ofﬁcials either, since they are used to isolation. 
Experts have questions about organization of tenders for broadcasting to Belarus, as well as 
about the effectiveness of the very concept of this broadcasting.
Observers note inconsistent policies pursued by several neighboring countries with re-
gard to the ofﬁcial Minsk. In particular, supporters of a more ﬂexible approach to contacts with 
Belarusian authorities are strong in Lithuania. Critics call this unscrupulous ﬂirting with the 
dictatorship. Proposals on simplifying visa policies for Belarusians stumble upon the fence of 
bureaucratic machinery and fears of the tide of illegal migration.
Also, a question is often asked as to the effectiveness of regular appeals of European au-
thorities to the Kremlin with the purpose of impelling it to do some «educational work» with 
the Belarusian leaders. In any case, at a recent PACE session the Russian delegation ardently 
defended its ally. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that at a major news conference in Mos-
cow on 31st January Vladimir Putin gave a rather equivocal answer to the question by France 
Press concerning Moscow’s support of Lukashenko’s rule. «As for my meetings with the Presi-
dent of Belarus, they have to do with support of the Belarusian people, who are fraternal to us, 
rather than support of the regime, as you have put it,» the Russian leader remarked. In saying 
that, Putin emphasized that «we run integration processes with Belarus. These processes are 
anything but simple, quite complicated. They often lead to a very sharp debate, as it happened 
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two years ago when «detaching» prices for energy sources for Belarus from Russian domestic 
prices. Everyone should remember this. Therefore, it is absolutely wrong to say that we are 
supporting a particular political ﬁgure at all costs.» This way Putin recalled the «gas war» of 
2004, forgotten by many, when Belarus became the ﬁrst, long before Ukraine, to experience 
Moscow’s special weapon — interruption of the natural gas supply. A few days earlier Alexan-
der Lukashenko also recalled that «gas war» in a large interview to the national TV channels. 
He could hardly hide his apprehension speaking of the inevitable growth of gas prices and the 
need to convert to resource-saving technologies and mitigating power dependency on Russia. 
Can this be a pure coincidence?
Just a small ﬂashback: after the two presidents’ December meeting in Sochi there were 
talks of Lukashenko’s receiving Moscow’s approval to run for his third presidency not for 
free, but in return for a promise to trade off BelTransGaz shares. The gas transporting system 
of Belarus has long been a coveted catch for Gazprom. The version of backroom agreements 
has been heated up by statements by top-managers of Gazprom itself, which made believe that 
the Belarusian «pipe» was basically a put-up job. However, Lukahenko’s and his high-rank of-
ﬁcials’ latest statements dispersed illusions on that score. Minsk still evaluates BelTransGaz 
at USD 5 billion, which is unacceptable for Moscow. Besides, the Kremlin is apparently irri-
tated by the obstinacy of the Belarusian side in discussion of the draft Constitutional Act of the 
Union State and its unwillingness to introduce the RF rouble as a single currency for the two 
countries. Observers believe that in both cases the authoritarian Belarusian ruler does not want 
to sacriﬁce a penny-weight of his individual power.
In the opinion of some experts, Russia may start seriously pressurizing Belarus. Howev-
er, it will not be because of the appeal from the West and deﬁnitely not for the sake of sublime 
ideas of democracy, but will be conditioned by Russia’s economic interests and great power 
aspirations. Nevertheless, the «last dictatorship in Europe» is at risk to ﬁnd itself between the 
beetle and the block.
Vital Voronovich. 06.02.06.
SECURING INSECURITY: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EU S´ INTERNAL 
SECURITY REGIME AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS
The evolution of the EU amidst the continued dramatic changes in Europe and the world 
has been radically changing its fundamental concepts, institutions and policies. Security is 
one such area where the speed and scope of transformations have been most stunning. It has 
been steadily losing its internal/external dichotomy and while the shaping of the CFSP and the 
ESDP is still underway, Justice, Freedom and Security (JFS or JLS — the French acronym) 
that is more and more often used in place of «Justice and Home Affairs» (JHA) are acquiring 
an external dimension and demand enhanced cross-pillar coordination, as well as new forms 
and mechanisms for coping with the external environment. Internal security experienced two 
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parallel processes: «Europeanization» and «externalization.»1 The latter is only a recent inno-
vation and is therefore in its formative stage.
AN EVOLVING DIMENSION
The Treaty of Amsterdam on the European Union which came into force on 1 May 1999 
stated that the EU:
• must be maintained and developed as an area of freedom, security and justice;
• (an area) in which the free movement of persons is assured;
• in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asy-
lum, immigration and the prevention and combating crime.
To this effect, the October 1999 Tampere European Council (the ﬁrst-ever devoted to 
JHA) adopted a ﬁrst work program, which implementation was achieved in 2004. At the Feira 
European Council it was emphasized that the justice and home affairs must be «incorporated 
into the Union’s overall external strategy as a contribution towards the establishment of the 
area of freedom, security and justice.»2 In 2000 an agreement was reached on general prin-
ciples on external relations of JHA and a plan containing priorities for the external dimension 
of JHA, known as the Tampere Scoreboard. The EU’s speciﬁc objectives here are to foster 
political stability, economic prosperity, and the rule of law with neighboring countries. This 
encompasses overcoming such challenges as restoring the rule of law, controlling migratory 
movements and ﬁghting organized crime. The guiding principles for the external dimension 
of JHA are fourfold: 
• relevance in creating an area of freedom, security and justice;
• added contribution to actions already performed by Member-States;
• contribution to the general political objectives of the EU’s external policy;
• completion within a reasonable period of time.3
On 4 November 2004 the European Council adopted the Hague Programme, which set 
the objectives to be implemented in the period 2005–2010. The Hague Programme has a whole 
page on external relations where it considers the development of a coherent external dimen-
sion of the Union policy of freedom, security and justice as a «growing priority». It called for 
a strategy on external relations by the end of 2005. The strategy should reﬂect the Union’s spe-
cial relations with third countries, groups of countries and regions, and focus on the speciﬁc 
needs for JHA cooperation with them.
1 Anderson, Malcolm, and Apap, Joanna. Changing Conceptions of Security and their Implications 
for EU Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation. Centre for European Policy Studies. CEPS Policy Brief  no. 
26 (October 2002); Bigo, Didier. When two become one. Internal and external securitisations in Europe // 
Kelstrup, Morten S., and Williams, Michael C. (Eds). International Relations Theory and the Politics of 
European Integration. Power, Security and Community. — London–New York: Routledge, 2000.
2 Santa Maria Da Feira European Council. 19 and 20 June 2000. Conclusions of the Presidency. 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/fei1_en.htm#IV 
3 Justice and home affairs a key area in the European Union’s relations with third countries and in-
ternational organizations. http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/external/fsj_external_intro_en.htm
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All powers available to the Union, including external relations, should be used in an in-
tegrated and consistent way to establish the area of freedom, security and justice. The follow-
ing guidelines should be taken into account:
• the existence of internal policies as the major parameter justifying external action;
• need for value added in relation to projects carried out by the Member States;
• contribution to the general political objectives of the foreign policies of the Union;
• possibility of achieving the goals during a period of reasonable time;
• the possibility of long-term action.4
The External relations and Enlargement unit has been created under the European Com-
mission’s DG JLS to ensure that the Justice and Home Affairs dimension is fully incorporated 
into the EU’s external policy in order to spread the values of justice, freedom and security to 
third countries. The Justice and Home affairs component of external relations covers a broad 
range of themes:
• the external dimension migration policy: importance of effective control of the EU’s 
external borders and signing readmission agreements with countries from which migratory 
ﬂows originate;
• the ﬁght against speciﬁc forms of crime such as ﬁnancial crime, money laundering, 
corruption and trading in human beings;
• the ﬁght against drug trafﬁcking: the EU ﬁnances measures for preventing and ﬁghting 
against drug production and trafﬁcking in several parts of the world;
• the strengthening of non-military aspects of crisis management and security through 
police cooperation in crisis regions.5
The implementation of the Justice and Home Affairs dimension in external relations is 
based on a number of different tools, including: 
• legal agreements with a justice, freedom and security chapter; 
• bilateral and ministerial meetings; 
• assistance programs; 
• sub-committees; 
• declarations; 
• action plans.6 
The Constitutional treaty, along with other changes, envisaged strengthening the powers 
of EU institutions, considerably reducing the inter-governmental character of JHA decision-
making and putting in place a more co-decisional procedure. In this way it could seriously 
facilitate the harmonization and uniﬁcation of JHA rules, procedures and policies of the mem-
4 Presidency Conclusions — Brussels, 4/5 November 2004. 14292/04 11. Annex I. The Hague Pro-
gramme. Strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.
5 Justice and Home Affairs are a key in the European Union’s relations with international orga-
nizations. http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/external/international/fsj_external_organisations_
en.htm 
6 External Relations and Enlargement – DG JLS – European Commission 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/justice_home/external/dg_external_en.htm
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ber-states. It could offer also a greater ﬂexibility of actions. Under the so-called «accelerator 
clause» it would allow at least on-third of member states to proceed with their initiative even 
if it has been blocked in the Council.7 This treaty, however, has not gone as far as to overcome 
the current fragmentation of Justice and Home Affairs, which are found in all the three EU 
pillars.
From the functional point of view the external dimension of the area of FSJ can be dis-
cerned in the three EU policy paradigms, which are separate from one another, mutually con-
tradictory, though not necessarily mutually exclusive but, yet again, not well-connected or 
coordinated (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Three policy paradigms and their implications for external borders8
The current unprecedented EU enlargement coupled with constitutional and other prob-
lems and terrorist attacks have further transformed the context, in which the Union’s JHA sys-
tem is being shaped. The «internal» security cannot be any more conﬁned solely to the terri-
tory of the Union and its member-states. Additionally, an ambitious European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) is striving to create a «ring» of stability and prosperity (i.e. to «project» security) 
along the perimeter of the enlarged EU.9 
7 See: Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
Council of the European Union, Brussels.  http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf 
8 See: Ehin, Piret. What kind of external borders for the EU? http://ec.ut.ee/transition/
External%20borders-Neighbourhood%20Policy.pdf  
9 See: European Neighbourhood Policy Srategy Paper. Communication from the Commission, 
Brussels, 12/05/04. Also: Waever, Ole. The EU as a Security Actor. Reﬂections from a pessimistic con-
structivist on post-sovereign security orders // Kelstrup, Morten S., and Williams, Michael C. (Eds). In-
ternational Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community. 
— London–New York: Routledge, 2000.
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JHA, THE ENP AND THE “NEW” EASTERN NEIGHBORS: IS THERE A PLACE FOR A FSJ 
AREA?
The Union and its ENP are facing multiple security challenges on the Eastern borders. 
Cooperation on Justice and Home affairs with the “new” Eastern neighbors has been difﬁcult, 
inefﬁcient, lacking a systemic character or, at best, rudimentary.
Firstly, the ENP has failed to embrace Russia along with Ukraine, Belarus and Mol-
dova. Nevertheless, EU-Russia relations seem to be more advanced than those with Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova, including the area of JHA.
The EU-Russia relationship is conducted within the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment framework which established a JHA sub-committee and a JHA Permanent Partnership 
Council at ministerial level. High level meetings regularly take place between the Commis-
sioner and the Presidential aide. Speciﬁc instruments to strengthen JHA cooperation have been 
jointly developed, such as the joint Action Plan on organized crime, and its implementation 
tool, the EU Liaison Ofﬁcers network. Europol–Russia Cooperation Agreement concluded in 
November 2003 provided for a framework for cooperation on criminal matters between EU-
ROPOL — the EU law enforcement organization and the Russian police. Under the TACIS 
technical assistance program, around €100 million has been spent on JHA projects, notably 
border management and support to judicial reform. The present Indicative Programme for the 
period 2004–06, covers judicial and law enforcement capacity building, the ﬁght against orga-
nized crime, and terrorism, the ﬁght against money laundering and migration issues, including 
support to improve the asylum system, tackle illegal migration and the issue of internally dis-
placed people in need of protection.10
Under Justice, Freedom and Security the EU and Russia aim at preventing and combat-
ing illegal activities, such as trafﬁcking in drugs, money-laundering, organized crime, corrup-
tion, illegal migration, trafﬁcking in human beings and vehicle theft, as well as strengthening 
judicial cooperation. It also includes assistance in developing border infrastructures, upgrading 
customs and cross-border posts, and enhancing skills of their personnel. The European Coun-
cil adopted the EU Action Plan on common action for Russia on combating organized crime 
in 2000.11 On 10 May 2005 the EU–Russia Summit concluded with an agreement on a pack-
age of measures to create four EU/Russia «common spaces» in the ﬁelds of economy, exter-
nal security, freedom, security and justice and education, research and culture. The principles, 
underlying the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice include democracy, the rule 
of law, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, including free and independent 
media and the effective application of common values by independent judicial systems. Work 
on this space provides for the adoption of agreements on readmission and visa facilitation. It 
encompasses cooperation on combating terrorism, organized crime and corruption. The road 
map for the Common Space of External Security underlines the shared responsibility of the 
EU and Russia for an international order based on effective multilateralism, their determina-
10 See: Common European Union strategy towards Russia in the area of justice and home affairs. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/external/russia/fsj_external_russia_en.htm 
11 Justice, Freedom and Security. http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_223.htm
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tion to co-operate to strengthen the central role of the United Nations, and promote the role 
and effectiveness of relevant international and regional organizations, in particular the OSCE 
and the Council of Europe.12 
Meanwhile, the «roadmap» format of EU cooperation with Russia is too «fuzzy» and 
misses concrete actions. As Michael Emerson writes, the four common spaces are a weaker 
and fuzzier still derivative of the neighborhood policy, giving only token attention to democ-
racy and excluding explicit reference to EU norms as the reference points for Russian-EU con-
vergence. They do not really inform about where the EU and Russia are heading.13
Secondly, Belarus is not fully engaged and is formally excluded from the EU’s coopera-
tion on security matters due to its notorious self-isolation.14 Among the countries on which the 
work of the European Commission’s DG JLS External relations and Enlargement unit mainly 
focuses are Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, but not Belarus. At the same time, in spite of se-
rious political tensions and the absence of an institutionalized cooperation between the EU 
and Belarus in the security area the latter has been a recipient (or a potential recipient) of the 
Union’s assistance on a number of security issues.15
Belarus is not found in any of the three levels of the EU’s security co-operation with 
third states. However its strategic ally Russia is, at least formally, positioned on the second 
one.16 This fact, however, does not in any way alleviate issues neither for Belarus, nor for Rus-
sia. To date, both the post-Soviet and Russia-Belarus frameworks represent more of a space of 
common unresolved problems, rather than a «common security space». As Russian experts ob-
serve, in addition to an inefﬁcient cooperation among law-enforcement bodies in the Common-
wealth of Independent States, in Russia itself there remain a high level of crime and corruption 
on all levels of power and cooperation between the Russian and Western security structures is 
12 For the texts of EU-Russia «Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security And Jus-
tice,» the «Road Map for the Common Space of External Security» and other documents see: http://www.
delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/465/Press%20release.doc
13 Emerson, Michael. EU-Russia Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy. Centre 
for European Policy Studies. CEPS Policy Brief no. 71/May 2005. P. 3.
14 Country Strategy Paper. National Indicative Programme Belarus 2005–2006. Adopted by the 
European Commission on 28 May 2004; Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. «Belarus in the Geopolitics of the ‘New 
Near East’: an independent variable?» // Enlarged EU — Enlarged Neigbhourhood. Perspectives of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Ed. by Nicolas Hayoz, Leszek Jesien, and Wim van Meurs. (Interdis-
ciplinary Studies on Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 2). Bern: Peter Lang, 2005; Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. 
Whence the Möbius strip of Belarusian Politics? [The current trends in Belarus’ relations with Russia, 
the US, the EU, and other international institutions] // Belarus: Youth, Politics and European Perspective. 
Smolensk: Neoprint, 2005.
15 See: Country Strategy Paper. National Indicative Programme Belarus 2005–2006.
16 Levels of security co-operation with third  States and international organisations. Council of the 
European Union. 14400/04. Brussels, 9 November 2004.
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inadequate.17 Even between such close allies as Russia and Belarus interaction in combating 
new security challenges leaves much to be desired.18
Thirdly, as for the Action Plans proposed for Ukraine19 and Moldova,20 those can be re-
alistically viewed as only the initial (and, besides, conditional) steps.
Moldova and Ukraine have become the ﬁrst two East European states among the ﬁrst 
seven of the EU’s neighbors to agree Action Plans that make concrete the European Union’s 
new offer under the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Action Plans will help strengthen 
democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights as well as helping with eco-
nomic modernization. In addition the EU is offering more targeted help to tackle cross border 
issues, such as migration and trafﬁcking. In the area of security the Plans will: 
• step up co-operation on border management, migration, trafﬁcking in human beings, 
organized crime, money laundering and ﬁnancial and economic crimes, 
• increase dialogue and co-operation on counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, as well as efforts to resolve regional conﬂict. 
The plans do not replace, but build on the existing Association or Co-operation Agree-
ment with each partner. The further a partner is ready to go in taking practical steps to imple-
ment common values, the further the EU will be ready to go in strengthening links.21
Fourthly, the overall political climate in the region (a «shared» or «common» Russia–
EU neighborhood imbued with various political problems, e.g. the alleged Russia’s claims on 
a special role in it’s «near abroad») is not making the situation any easier. 
In addition to the ENP, bilateral and multilateral JHA-related programs, which are con-
ducted jointly with the UN ofﬁces there are also some «umbrella» projects to embrace West-
ern NIS. The European Commission plans to launch a pilot program in Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine to offer protection to refugees and manage migration ﬂows. The program will be 
aimed at providing direct assistance and protection to refugees. According to the Commission 
17 Fedorov, Andrei. Home Security: Russia’s Challenges. A Russian Perspective // European Home-
land Security Post-March 11th and Transatlantic Relations. European Security Forum Working Paper No. 
17. Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels — The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lon-
don. October 2004. P. 25. 
18 See, in particular: Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. «EU Enlargement and Belarus: A ‘Collage’ of Secu-
rity Spaces» // Yevropeiskoye buduschee Belarusi [Belarus’ European Future. In Russian]. Proceedings of 
a seminar. Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung. Regional Bureau for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Ed. by Helmut 
Kurth. Minsk: Donarit, 2004; Also:  Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. EU and Belarus: a transit of (in)security [In 
Russian and in German]. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005.
19 See: Proposed EU/Ukraine Action Plan. http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/ﬁles/
Action%20Plan%20Text-ﬁnal-website.pdf  In 2001 an Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs and the 
related scoreboard were agreed between the EU and Ukraine.
20 See: Proposed EU/Moldova Action Plan. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/action_
plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-Moldova.pdf
21 European Neighbourhood Policy: the ﬁrst Action Plans. http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/site/
page32426.html
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spokesman, «contacts with the government will be limited to what is strictly necessary for the 
efﬁcient implementation of the projects and the program will be largely carried out through 
cooperation with nongovernmental organizations.»22
Meanwhile, refugees seeking asylum in the European Union dropped in number by 34 
per cent from 425,520 to 282,480 between 2002 and 2004. Great Britain and France are major 
destinations, receiving some 60,000 asylum seekers annually each. Over the same period the 
number of asylum seekers in the new EU member states has grown by 21 per cent. In 2003–
2004 the greatest numbers of refuges to Europe came from Russia (9, 8 per cent of the total 
ﬁgure).23
TRANSIT SECURITY OF THE EU’S EASTERN NEIGHBORS: A LIMITING FACTOR 
FOR THE SHAPING OF A PAN-EUROPEAN INTERNAL SECURITY REGIME
A major predicament for the shaping of a Pan-European internal security regime is a spe-
ciﬁc phenomenon of transit security of some of EU’s Eastern neighbors. The latter either have 
no immediate interest in joining the European Union or sharing its values (Belarus), or indicate 
their interest in membership (Ukraine and Moldova), but may approach such opportunities in 
a relatively remote future. 
The underlying security strategy of the European Union is based on creating structur-
al soft security conditions in its international environment. However this strategy can suc-
ceed if there is a high degree of its neighbors’ engagement in cooperation short of interdepen-
dence. Being rather far away from such status, these states perform functions of  «relaying» 
(in)security among their international counterparts: other states, corporations, international or-
ganizations and actors, including sub-state units. Besides, their strategy is that of balancing 
among security risks and challenges of their neighbors. 
This phenomenon is not unique with regard to some particular state and cannot be re-
duced to a sum of geopolitical, geo-economic or civilizational characteristics — geographical 
position at the juncture of or in between powerful political, economic, and/or civilizational 
centers, which are connected by mutually needed exchanges and interdependence.  
Additionally, the states under discussion are typologically transitive. They have not yet 
ﬁnalized their political and economic model or have not yet made a deﬁnitive choice in favor 
of one or the other neighboring power centers. This reproduces ambivalence of national inter-
ests, identities and international subjectivity, which may manifest in contradictory relation-
ships with neighbors.  
A state pursuing a «transit security» policy relays, in addition to its own risks and chal-
lenges, those of its counterparts. This is being done not only in a «physical» form, but also 
through discourses24: via diplomatic, political, economic, informational (including the mass 
media) means, and also in various situations of group and individual encounters at the profes-
sional (state bureaucracies, business, culture, etc.) or ordinary people-to-people levels. 
22 EU to launch pilot refugee protection programme in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova. 14/09/2005 
http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2005/09/14/progr 
23 Ibid.
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Figure 2. A Transit (In)security Model: receiving/accumulation/transformation/relaying 
Therefore, an aggregated politico-informational space of a transit state is constantly gen-
erating various implications of transit challenges and risks, or, otherwise, is constructing them 
(See Figure 2.). In this sense security transit is simultaneously creating and destroying regional 
security complexes.
CONCLUSIONS
Globalization and the resultant impetus it has given to non-traditional transnational 
threats need ﬂexible responses. To ﬁght these «new» threats, a global enforcement regime 
has been created.  At the UN and G8 level conventions against transnational organized crime 
and regulations to counter money laundering are accepted, while the UN Security Council has 
set in motion a global program against international terrorism. The wide array of multilateral 
agreements, conventions, rules and regulations on drugs, crime, money laundering and ter-
rorism are reached at inter-governmental level (such as the UN, G8, the EU) and presented as 
a fait accompli before national parliaments that are pressured to ratify them. No government 
wants to be labeled as an outcast because a national parliament refuses to ratify these inter-
national agreements that are the result of complicated diplomatic bargaining and an alleged 
international consensus. At the level of the European Union a similar process is taking place 
in order to harmonize its justice and security area. Critics are saying that there are few mecha-
nisms in place to evaluate the effectiveness or adverse effects of this regime, nor does it take 
any account of the root causes or grievances of those who have opposed the status quo. They 
emphasize the need to promote an alternative agenda to realign the focus of ‘security’ from 
enforcement and repression towards a «human security» agenda that looks to root causes and 
social solutions and puts more emphasis on good governance, social and economic develop-
ment and human rights.25
In October 2005 the European Commission adopted a strategy on the external dimen-
sion of the area of freedom, security and justice speciﬁcally addressing the task of engaging 
24 From the vantage point of social constructivism a communicative action is a rhetorical action. 
See, for example: Risse, Thomas. «Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics» // International 
Organization. Vol. 54. No. 1. Winter 2000. P. 1–39; Müller, Harald. «International Relations as Communi-
cative Action» // Fierke, Karin M., Jørgensen, Knud Erik. Constructing International Relations: The Next 
Generation. — Armonk, New York — London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Pp. 160–178.
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the EU on these matters with third countries worldwide. The new Strategy outlines the main 
external challenges facing the area of freedom, security and justice identiﬁes the objectives of 
the EU’s external actions in this ﬁeld, the issues to be addressed worldwide, the instruments at 
the EU’s disposal and the principles for selecting appropriate actions, outlines how the strat-
egy could be applied by geographic area and makes some recommendations to facilitate its 
implementation.26 The document makes it a point that the projection of the values underpin-
ning the area of freedom, security and justice is essential in order to safeguard the internal se-
curity of the Union. Thus, a further elaboration of the external dimension of the FSJ is making 
it more «inclusive» in the sense that there will be a smaller distinction between the internal and 
external meaning and application of the EU’s concept of freedom, which is based on internal 
security provided through effective law enforcement and access to justice.27
This, however, is sharpening the contrast between the EU and several FSU formations, 
which have declared similar goals in their integration efforts: the Russia–Belarus «Union 
State,» the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), the Single Economic Space (SES), 
and, eventually, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). All of them agreed on the 
«four freedoms» as cornerstones of their conceptual documents and policy goals. Neverthe-
less, these «freedoms» are more of a «functional» or «technical» character28 and do not match 
the EU acquis, least of all its acquis of JHA. This, in particular, refers to such EU priorities as 
human rights and strengthening institutions and good governments29 — issues of great concern 
in the case of Belarus and other FSU states.
A brief analysis suggests that prospects for an early emergence of a European internal 
security regime (a regime of European governance for freedom, security and justice with its ef-
fective external dimension)30 are rather dim. Under the present circumstances, one can observe 
a «collage» of security spaces31 between the EU and Eastern Europe, rather than an emerging 
Pan-European internal security regime. A further strengthening of elements of a «global en-
forcement regime,» some of which are already in place, may help to build support for the re-
alization of a more distant goal. This, again, underscores the importance of the EU’s strategic 
concept of effective multilateralism.32
Vyachaslau Pazdnyak – Wider Europe Review. Vol. 2. No. 3 (Summer 2005).
25 Global Enforcement Regimes. Transnational Organised Crime, International Terrorism and Mon-
ey Laundering. TNI Crime and Globalisation seminar. Amsterdam, 28–29 April, 2005. Transnational In-
stitute. http://www.tni.org/crime
26 Communication from the Commission a strategy on the external dimension of the area of free-
dom, security and justice. Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 12.10.2005 COM(2005) 
491 ﬁnal http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0491en01.pdf 
27 See: Monar, Jörg. «An Emerging Regime of European Governance for Freedom, Security and 
Justice.» ESRC «One Europe or Several?» Programme Brieﬁng Note 2/99, November1999. Monar, Jörg. 
«Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion.» ESRC ‘One 
Europe or Several?’ Programme Working Paper 07/00. http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/pdf/monarW7.PDF
28 See, for example: Kontseptsiya formirovaniya Yedinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva [The 
Concept of shaping a Single economic space. In Russian], 19 September 2003. 
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29 Communication from the Commission. A strategy on the external dimension of the area of free-
dom, security and justice. P. 6.
30 For a conceptualization of a European internal security regime see: Monar, Jörg. “An Emerging 
Regime of European Governance for Freedom, Security and Justice.” 
31 See: Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. “EU Enlargement and Belarus: A ‘Collage’ of Security Spaces // 
Yevropeiskoye buduschee Belarusi [Belarus’ European Future. In Russian]. Proceedings of a seminar. 
Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung. Regional Bureau for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Ed. by Helmut Kurth. Minsk: 
Donarit, 2004; Also:  Pazdnyak, Vyachaslau. EU and Belarus: a transit of (in)security [In Russian and in 
German]. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005. 
32 See: Communication from the Commission a strategy on the external dimension of the area of 
freedom, security and justice, and .Solana, Javier. A secure Europe in a better world. Document adopted 
at the European Council in Brussels, 12 December 2003. Paris: The EU Institute for Security Studies (De-
cember 2003).
DIVERSIFICATION OF BELARUSIAN EXPORTS THROUGH BALTIC PORTS
The Government of Belarus resolved to transfer part of cargo trafﬁc 
from the Ventspils seaport to that of Klaipeda
Sergey Sidorski, Prime Minister of Belarus, announced in the course of his meeting with 
Petras Vaitekiunas, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Lithuanian Republic 
to Belarus, that it had been resolved to transfer part of cargo trafﬁc from the Ventspils seaport 
to that of Klaipeda. This became the result of the efforts undertaken by Vilnius, which over the 
past years had been pursuing a consistent strategy on attracting an increasingly larger share of 
Belarusian exports though the Klaipeda seaport. For Minsk it became an advantageous option 
in view of the increasing threat of economic sanctions on the part of the European Union. It 
also could be a leverage to inﬂuence the policy of Riga, regarded in Minsk as non-amicable, 
which ostentatiously supports the Belarusian opposition.
«We have very good relations with the seaport of Klaipeda. Belarusian cargo currently 
covers over 25% of the Klaipeda seaport trafﬁc,» the head of the Belarusian Government re-
marked during the meeting with Lithuanian Ambassador. To quote him, a decision was taken 
to transfer additional 100 thousand tons of cargo to the Klaipeda seaport from Ventspils. «Be-
larus accounts for over 20 million tons of cargo,» Sergey Sidorski said, emphasizing that the 
Klaipeda seaport needs to compete against those of Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and Nikolayev. 
So far this statement by Belarusian Prime Minister has received no comments from Moscow.
The head of the Belarusian Government also expressed his satisfaction with the develop-
ment of trade and economic cooperation with Lithuania. «It is very important that Lithuanian 
businessmen are happy with the investment environment in Belarus», Sergey Sidorski stated, 
accentuating that Belarus has «one of the best and most transparent investment codes.» «The 
existing problems are contrived. Those who want to work conﬁrm this,» believes Belarusian 
Prime Minister.
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The advantage of the Klaipeda seaport is that it is the northernmost ice-free port and also 
the closest one to Belarus. It is 680 km from Minsk to Klaipeda and 1,100 km from Minsk to 
Ventspils. The port has a trafﬁc capacity of 40 mln. tons. The Klaipeda port transports over 
4,5 mln. tons of Belarusian cargo, 1.950 mln. tons of Russian cargo, and 12.943 mln.tons of 
that of Lithuania. The major share of Belarusian cargo is oil products, which take 445 of the 
total volume; they are followed by fertilizers (26%), food stuffs and forage (21%), and metal 
products (5%). Last year the Ventspils port transported 8.17 mln. tons of Belarusian cargo, the 
major part of which was oil products and fertilizers. The total cargo turnover of the seaport n 
2004 made 27.8 mln. tons.
Besides, the Belarusian side has announced its intent to carry out a pilot delivery of po-
tassium fertilizers through Kaliningrad in the 4th quarter of 2005. The capacity of the Kalinin-
grad port for handling Belarusian exports is evaluated at 1 mln. tons per year. Ofﬁcial Minsk is 
not giving up on using the capacities of the Gdansk seaport. In late summer these hopes were 
discussed at the level of Ministries of Transportation of Poland and Belarus.
Some observers believe that it is quite possible for Belarus’ activity on diversiﬁcation 
of its exports through Baltic ports to make another topic for discussion of the «Belarusian is-
sue» in Brussels. According to the resolution of the European Commission, a monitoring of the 
Belarusian authorities’ adherence to the rights of trade unions is currently being performed. A 
negative result of this monitoring may involve introduction of economic sanctions. 
Roman Yakovlevsky. 27.10.05.
COOPERATION CANAL: CONSTRUCTION WORK AT THE AUGUSTOW CANAL 
CONTINUED EVEN IN WINTER
By June 1st, 2006 the Augustow Canal should be ready for commis-
sioning. Apart from being a waterway, it is also regarded as a tourist 
sight. The prepared investment projects envisage constructing a mill, 
restaurants, country homesteads, a smithy, crafts centers, night clubs 
and even facilities for downhill skiing in the vicinity
BACKGROUND
The Augustow Canal was built from 1825 to 1839 on the initiative of the Polish King-
dom, after the designs by Polish engineers, but with the imperial assent of Russian Tsar Alex-
ander I. The main reason for the construction was fear that Prussia’s tariff policy will impede 
transportation of Polish and Lithuanian commodities to the Baltic coast. Approximately until 
the 1950s, water ways to the Baltic Sea were used primarily for drifting logs down the stream 
and carriage of passengers. The Augustow Canal is peculiar in that is starts from Necko Lake 
and stretches from one lake to another up to the border between Belarus and Poland. Nowa-
days it is actively used for tourism. According to Leszek Teczlik, burghermaster of the town of 
Augustow, during the season the Canal attracts up to 100 thousand tourists.
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In Belarus, from the border to the village of Sonichi the Canal ﬂows in the natural bed 
of the Chernaya Gancha River, then it ﬂows in the man-made bed for 6.5 km to the Neman 
River. This is the shortest way from Poland to the Baltic Sea. The canal locks in Poland are 
recognized as ﬁrst grade works of ancient engineering. In Belarus by 2004 they were 70% de-
stroyed. Approximately in the mid 1950s, the Canal was abandoned on the Belarusian side. 
Frosts literally broke the cast iron bracings on the lock gates made of oak, while metal parts of 
hydraulic works, bricks from the bottom, and granite veneers were stolen by local residents. In 
1993 an attempt was made to restore the Belarusian part of the Canal but no funds were found. 
It all ended with preparing design documentation.
BUILDERS OF TODAY
The modern history of the Canal started last December, after the publication of Presi-
dent’s decree on restoration of the waterway of Augustow Canal. Its peculiarity lay in combi-
nation of theory and practice on a very tight schedule. Information to compare: while in the 
early 19th century it took 15 years to construct the Canal under General Pradzynski’s guid-
ance, its present restoration is to take a little over two years. The ﬁrst builders showed up here 
on March 2nd, 2004, and the completion of work is scheduled for June 1st, 2006. Specialists 
of the oblast unitary enterprise of GrodnoMelioVodKhoz, who are current «hosts» of the con-
struction, say that in six months — by May 10th, 2006 — they expect to ﬁll the Canal with 
water. It means that by this time the canal locks should be completely ready and the naviga-
tion channel of the Chernaya Gancha River should be formed. Therefore construction work is 
continued in the winter time.
RESTORATION VARIANTS
Two variants for restoration of the Canal were originally proposed. The ﬁrst one was to 
deepen the bed of the Chernaya Gancha River in order to let small tourist boats pass. The sec-
ond one (which got selected) envisaged maximum restoration of the Canal the way it used to 
be, that is making the Chernaya Gancha navigable once again. It means that its bed should be 
at least 1.5 m deep and 6 m wide. However, it is impossible to restore the Canal to its original 
form. Over 180 years the water level in the Neman fell by two meters, therefore, the three-
chamber navigation lock of Nemnovo, the largest in the entire Belarusian-Polish stretch of the 
Canal, received a fourth chamber. Besides, the Neman changed its bed, so the Canal became 
1.8 km longer. The builders had to dig a new bed along the dead arm of the river (the old river-
bed).
When ﬁxing the banks, the builders stuck to old techniques in some places, sheathing 
the slopes with wooden slats and wooden poles. In other places they used gravel chippings and 
special canvas (grass can grow through it). The walls of canal locks used to be lined with gran-
ite and sandstone from Poland; nowadays these materials are imported from Bashkortostan 
and Carpathian mountains, respectively. In order to receive frost-proof and moisture-resistant 
bricks for the bottom of the lock chambers, a whole plant in Vitebsk oblast had to invent and 
develop it and have it certiﬁed.
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The Chernaya Gancha River has been «straightened» and broadened in some places but 
its old circuitous course has not been drained. The river ﬂows into the Neman concurrently 
with the straight line of the Canal. The swampy areas around the Canal have been drained. This 
way there appeared islands and meadow parks in the midst of the Canal. Here and there water 
has been piped in to form lagoons, ponds, and basins. As a rule, piers have been built next to 
them. A ferry crossing is completely ready in the vicinity of the village of Lesnaya. The ferry 
was purchased from the Petrikov Shipbuilding Plant for 200 million roubles. It will be soon 
delivered to Grodno. Air-cushion vessels (they have been ordered in St. Petersburg) will cruise 
along the Canal.
BELARUSIAN-POLISH COOPERATION
The navigation lock of Kuzhinets is situated immediately on the border between Belarus 
and Poland. From the Belarusian side, a seasonal border crossing point of Novaya Rudovka 
is situated right next to the lock, so currently there is no access to the monument of hydraulic 
engineering. From the Polish side there is free access to the lock. Restoration of Kuzhinets and 
its surrounding maintenance area is performed by Polish builders. The work is expected to be 
completed by the beginning of navigation. The approximate cost of the work is EUR 0.5 mil-
lion. The construction work is regulated by a Belarusian-Polish agreement. The issue of draft-
ing an international Belarusian-Polish agreement on the use of the Augustow Canal has been 
discussed. When the Canal becomes a single water artery, there is a proposal to enter it on the 
UNESCO list. The draft is currently being coordinated between the two sides.
PROJECT COST
It is intended to spend 33 billion roubles on restoration of the Augustow Canal. The 
sources of ﬁnancing include the State Inspectorate for Protection of Fauna and Flora under the 
President of Belarus (the main source), the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection, the Grodno Oblast Committee for Natural Resources and Environmental Protec-
tion, and the Emergency Fund of the President of Belarus.
Inna Maximchik. 19.12.05.
IGNALINA PASSION
The talks with the EU on extending operation of the Ignalina nuclear 
power plant may resume
Algirdas Brazauskas, Prime Minister of Lithuania, does not rule out the possible neces-
sity to resume Lithuania’s talks with the EU on the issue of extending the operating life of 
the Ignalina nuclear power plant (INPP) after 2009. «Anything can happen and we should be 
prepared for such variant. I also support the need for seeking arguments, and some arguments 
have already transpired. A lot has changed at the INPP itself since the beginning of our NPP 
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talks in 2001–2001. Its technical characteristics and control and security parameters have been 
noticeably improved,» Prime Minister reported in his interview to the Lithuanian radio.
The factor that may inﬂuence the decision to resume talks is the failure to reach an agree-
ment with Poland on implementing the project of combining electric power systems of Lithu-
ania and Poland, thus connecting them to the electrical systems of EU countries. According to 
Prime Minister, without this, under the conditions of growing prices for oil and gas Lithuania 
may ﬁnd itself in a difﬁcult situation. Touching upon the issue of constructing a new reactor, A. 
Brazauskas accentuated that «it is going to be a commercial facility, and it may be actuated if 
this region experiences a real need for electric power.» To quote the head of the Government, 
this issue should be negotiated with Latvia, Estonia, and probably Poland.
The issue of postponing a complete shutdown of the INPP was already discussed in the 
second half year of 2004, but the European Commission disapproved of it, following which 
Vilnius decided that Lithuania would meet its commitments to the European Union and shut 
down the INPP on the scheduled date.
POTENTIAL REPOSITORY SITES
One of the planned repository sites is in the settlement of Galilauke, which is only 700 m 
away from the Belarusian-Lithuanian border and 7 km away from the border with Latvia. Af-
ter the information of the Ministry of Economics of Lithuania, no ofﬁcial resolution has been 
taken so far with regard to the repository for short-lived and medium-lived radioactive waste. 
The issue is still being studied. The IAEA experts have published a resolution acknowledging 
that the performed research conforms to the best international practical achievements and in-
ternational standards. The prepared report on the environmental impact evaluation will need to 
be supplemented – not without pressure from Belarusian and Latvian neighbors. Latvia is the 
second country, which is concerned about the dangerous proximity to the repository. Ground 
water runs from Galilauke in the direction of its territory.
Public response was caused by the issue of a surface repository for low- and medium-
activity waste, which has a relatively short life span of 300 years. It takes so much time for 
the substances and materials, encapsulated in containers and buried in reinforced concrete, 
will turn into regular waste. However, if the repository is built in Galilauke, near the border 
between Lithuania and Belarus, generations of people will have to live in immediate proxim-
ity to it.
At present, the list of potential sites for the repository has been supplemented with a new 
name of Sabatiske, a place situated 5 km away from the border with Belarus. Here geologists 
found another hill with a thick cap of clay, which can protect ground water from possible con-
tamination with radioactive waste. Jonas Satkunas, Deputy Director of the Geological Survey 
of Lithuania, reported that at the moment additional research was underway in the area of Sa-
batiske. However, in his opinion, it will be difﬁcult to make this hill as safe for the repository 
as the one in Galilauke.
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STORY OF IGNALINA
Lithuania’s Government adopted a resolution to shut down the Ignalina NPP (INPP) 
before 2009 as a condition of joining the European Union. Despite the attempts to keep the 
plant that covered 80% of national demand for electric power, by December 31st, 2004 the ﬁrst 
block was removed from operation. Nowadays there is no doubt whatsoever that Lithuanians 
will accurately meet their EU commitments and in three years the second block will be shut 
down. Ignalina is basically a clone of Chernobyl and, in the opinion of EU experts, an addi-
tional risk factor (despite its recent upgrades).
According to Arturas Dainius, Secretary of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of 
Lithuania (he deals with the issue of the INPP disassembly), several possible variants of ac-
tion have already been worked out. «It is certainly possible to suspend the reactor and leave 
everything as it is for about 50 years, but who knows if this issue remains as topical then and 
if funds are available,» Mr. Dainius says.
One of the most expensive ways, which is full disassembly of the INPP, is regarded as 
the most likely. It is planned to ﬁnance the project from the EU budget. Ground disposal will 
reduce the cost of shutting down the plant and secure better safety of the waste, Arturas Dain-
ius maintains. He does not deny that so far negotiations with Russia concerning the transfer of 
waste for keeping have not come to any results and Lithuanians will have to handle the prob-
lem of «what to do with the nuclear inheritance» on their own.
REPOSITORY DESIGN
So far all the waste that has accumulated since 1983, when the Ignalina NPP was com-
missioned, is contained in the plant zone in special storage facilities. Let us remind you that 
the Ignalina NPP is supposed to be shut down in 2010. After the shutdown of the reactor, it 
will take ﬁve years for the temperature to drop to 100 degrees, and then it will be possible to 
start disassembly work.
The long-lived waste, spent nuclear fuel in particular, will never leave this zone and re-
main in deep underground repositories in the territory of the plant. All that was not in the ac-
tive zone (equipment, special-purpose uniforms, cooling water) will be placed in containers in 
the form of solid substances and then in the surface repository, the site for which has not been 
determined so far. In forty years a lawn will cover the area where there used to be two Ignali-
na’s reactors, and there will be forest around the near-surface repository. Inside the mount-type 
structure, short-lived and medium-lived radioactive waste with a half-life period of 30 to 300 
years will be «packed» in containers. The bottom of the repository should be at least two or 
three meters above the water level. Shown in section, its construction resembles a matrioshka 
doll, where containers are placed in sections of reinforced concrete inside cells of clay, dirt, 
sand, and gravel. The last layer is green grass. Accoding to Saulius Kutas, head of VATESI (the 
State Inspectorate for Nuclear Power Engineering Safety), the sections will be ﬁlled season-
ally, that is only in the summer time. In order to prevent soil percolation of radionuclides with 
water, tanks will be built under the basement, where any liquid is supposed to run down.
Belarusian experts believe that the planned capacity of the repository may be 100 thou-
sand cubic meters. However, the Lithuanian side insists that Ignalina and its surrounding area 
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will accommodate only the waste resulting from the disassembly of the plant, and not brought 
from all over the world. Theoretically, the contents are not supposed to come out even if a jet 
crashes on the repository. In accordance with the existing international regulations, Belarus 
cannot veto construction of the waste disposal site, but is entitled to receive technical speci-
ﬁcations of the designed facilities and invite independent experts to perform environmental 
expertise, considers First Deputy Minister of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protec-
tion Vassily Podolyako. 
VILNIUS’ OPINION
In Vilnius they are of the opinion that after the shutdown of the INPP Lithuania should 
remain a country having nuclear power; that is to say that a new modern Western-made reactor 
should be constructed. Experts and the Lithuanian Government believe that the Ignalina site is 
ideal for this construction, since it has all the required infrastructure and qualiﬁed specialist.
However, Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas has many times noted that 
Lithuania is unable to build a new nuclear power plant on its national budget. In saying that, 
he emphasized the need for attracting either private capital or investments from the neighbor-
ing Baltic States to implement this project. No concrete resolutions have been taken on this 
issue so far.
SAFETY LEVEL
In the late 2005 IAEA experts carried out examination of the methods of disassembling 
the plant and, in particular, of environmental impact assessments (EIA) for the repository for 
short-lived low- and medium-activity radioactive waste. The latest version of the EIA provides 
a prudent estimation of the annual external radiation dose to be received by local residents. 
It is lower than the natural background radiation. Lithuanian and Belarusian experts disagree 
on the assessment of the natural environment around the INPP. Lithuanian experts claim that 
this place is very scarcely inhabited and that there are neither valuable species of wood nor 
rare birds in the area. Belarusian ecologists name unique ﬂora and fauna of the basin of the 
Braslav Lakes, which are situated in immediate proximity to the plant and make a single wa-
ter system.
PROJECT COST
The Lithuanian side insists that it will be a modern safe repository, built with after the 
latest technology. The total cost of disassembly of the INPP is currently evaluated at over one 
billion euros. Construction of one section of the near-surface repository will cost approxi-
mately 1,200 euros, the total repository will cost up to 300 million euros, and the initial stage 
is estimated at 40 million euros.
Minister of Economy Kestutis Dauksis has announced that Lithuania should make a de-
cision on constructing a new nuclear power plant in the near future. «No later than by the end 
of this year a decision should be taken on the fact of construction, the location and funding of 
the new nuclear power plant,» Minister said. In K. Dauksis’ opinion, it is necessary to provide 
for investment to the amount of about 350 million euros for the initial stage of the project im-
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plementation. The Government of Lithuania should own at least 34% of the shares of the new 
NPP. Other co-owners could be power companies of Estonia and Latvia, which have already 
announced their agreement, as well as other investors. The Minister considers that, if the deci-
sion on constructing a new power-generating unit is taken this year, its construction may start 
in 2008 and be completed in 2013.
K. Dauksis also mentioned that, along with solving the issue of constructing a new 
power-generating unit, it is necessary to negotiate the extension of the operating life of opera-
tional second nuclear unit of the INPP until the new power-generating unit is completed. But 
he evaluated the chance of reaching an agreement on this issue as slight.
There is another question to this: what is going to happen to the town of Visaginas, 
where almost all residents are employed at the INPP or somehow connected with it? The very 
shutdown of the plant is a big business. Well-known Lithuanian companies are currently com-
peting for the right to perform disassembly work and its service. Disassembly of the plant is 
going to take approximately 35 years. Over this time the specialists of today will grow old and 
will not be able to work for age reasons. At the moment, a strategy is being developed in order 
to establish several smaller facilities on the basis of a single big one of the INPP. It is necessary 
to prioritize economic needs and get people interested in founding their small businesses. It is 
assumed that this will allow for solving the problem of employment in Visaginas.
Inna Maximchik. 16.01.06.
ANDREI STRATAN: «THE MOST IMPORTANT GOAL OF MOLDOVA IS CONSIS-
TENT INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS»
Exclusive interview of Andrei Stratan, Vice Prime Minister, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova
The European Union has recently opened its representation in Chisinau. What are the 
priority tasks of Moldova in the ﬁeld of integration into the European Union?
- A. S. First of all, I would like to note that currently Moldova has no a permanent rep-
resentation of the European Union. At the same time, the EU Council, at the beginning of this 
year, appointed its Special Representative to Moldova Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, whose 
mission is to actively assist in peaceful solution of the Trans-Dniester problem and stability 
in the region. 
During negotiations on the Plan of Actions, a political solution was made at the top level 
to open the Delegation of the European Commission in Chisinau, which will take place this 
September. In this context, I would like to note that on 1 January this year, Moldova opened its 
Permanent Representation in the European Union. 
For the purpose of successful implementation of the Plan of Actions between the Repub-
lic of Moldova and the EU, the National Programme for introduction of the Plan of Actions 
was created, which represents a well-structured document in terms of strategy and tactics, with 
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clear tasks to involve state authorities and a speciﬁc schedule of implementation. Also, at this 
moment, the European strategy for the Republic of Moldova is being ﬁnalized; this is a docu-
ment that presents even a more detailed project for achieving the priority goal in domestic and 
external policies of Moldova. Speaking about the initial tasks to achieve the essential goal by 
Moldova, i.e., a consistent integration into economic and social units of the European Union, 
the Republic of Moldova has assumed commitments to implement, by the end of 2007, coor-
dinated measures stipulated by the Plan of Actions of Moldova and the EU. This plan attaches 
special attention to the very important package of priorities, namely: 
- peaceful regulation of the Trans-Dniester conﬂict;
- enhancing of stability and efﬁcacy of institutions that guarantee democracy and the 
rule of law; 
- ensuring democratic elections in Moldova according to European standards; 
- ensuring freedom of press and opinions; 
- continuation of judicial reforms to achieve independence of courts; 
- improvement of the investment climate through adequate structural reforms as regards 
ensuring non-discriminatory conditions and public openness; among other things, through 
combating corruption; 
- intensiﬁcation of ﬁght with organized crime, including trafﬁcking of people; 
- ensuring effective management of migration ﬂows; among other things, through ini-
tiation of the process to make an agreement on readmission between the EU and the Republic 
of Moldova. 
It is known that Ukraine has become actively involved in the solution of the Trans-Dni-
ester conﬂict. Its latest initiatives have been supported by all parties of the conﬂict, as well as 
by the European Union, NATO and other international institutions. Does this activity of Kiev 
mean that the role of Moscow in this region diminishes? 
- A. S. At this stage, I will prefer not to hurry with conclusions about a consensus be-
tween all parties involved into the conﬂict as regards supporting the Ukrainian plan. The posi-
tion of the Republic of Moldova on this plan was clearly stated in the package of documents, 
unanimously adopted by the Moldova Parliament on 10 June 2005. 
As regards the roles played by Ukraine and Russia, the situation can be rather character-
ized as follows: Ukraine is gradually taking its proper place in the process of regulation, while 
the Russian Federation retains its exclusively important role. It should be remembered in this 
respect, that the Trans-Dniester conﬂict is located at the border with Ukraine, but not with Rus-
sia. Therefore, Kiev is directly interested in its solution. Today’s leadership in Kiev takes sig-
niﬁcant measures so that Ukraine plays its proper role according to its position. We can only 
welcome activation of our neighbour and, at the same time, we believe that this will help ﬁnd 
such a solution that will be beneﬁcial, primarily, for the people of Moldova living on both sides 
of the Dniester River. So, the role of Russia is not diminished at all. Simply, we expect from 
Moscow a more constructive approach both in seeking a political solution of the Trans-Dnies-
ter problem and in its withdrawal of arms and troops according to Istanbul agreements taken 
by Russia at the OSCE summit in 1999.
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Moldova is the only European country among «new neighbours» of the European Union 
who is member of WTO. To what extent, and how, does this status help Moldova to integrate 
into Europe? 
- A. S. Accession to WTO, participation in the activities within the Pact of for South-East 
Europe and the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), as well as in implementa-
tion of the Plan of Actions between Moldova and the EU are important tools to attain the main 
goal of Moldova, which is integration to the EU. WTO membership in itself includes a range of 
ﬁelds which coincide with the rules and legislation of the EU Common Market. Namely, they 
are: procurement, intellectual property, transparency of technical trade barriers, subsidies and 
rules of trade in services. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
provides for commercial presence abroad and, hence, gives EU enterprises in Moldova cer-
tain rights to the common market. None of these WTO rules entails integration similar to the 
EU. However, they represent a useful foundation for transparency and predictability of these 
rules. The Plan of Actions between Moldova and the EU gives Moldova a signiﬁcant degree of 
economic integration and a deeper political cooperation. An important element along this line 
is the opportunity included into the Plan of Actions for giving a broader access for Moldovan 
commodities to the EU market through autonomous trade preferences (ATP). 
At the same time, being member of the Pact of Stability in South-East Europe, Moldova 
has signed and commenced implementing bilateral free trade agreements with Bulgaria, Ro-
mania and ﬁve countries which are parties to the Process of stability and association. In this 
context, we actively support the idea of creating a free trade area in the South-East Europe 
through integration to the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) of countries which 
signed the respective Memorandum on trade liberalization or creation of a new free trade area 
in the South-East Europe (SEEFTA).
Relations between the European Union and such new «new neighbour» as Belarus leave 
much to be desired. In what way would you characterize the current state of relations between 
Moldova and Belarus? 
- A. S. Moldova has always been in favour of developing relations with all countries of 
the world. The basis of Moldovan-Belarusian relations is rather close trade and economic ties 
which are based on a number of intergovernmental agreements, and they are mutually beneﬁ-
cial. A special role is played by the Intergovernmental Moldovan-Belarusian Commission on 
trade and economic cooperation.
Moldovan-Belarusian relations in the ﬁeld of trade and economic cooperation are char-
acterized by high dynamics; in 2004, Moldova and Belarus reached an unprecedented high 
level of bilateral trade exchanges. The Republic of Belarus takes a ﬁrm 6th place among 128 
foreign trade partners of the Republic of Moldova. In 2004, the total trade turnover between 
the two countries made 128 million USD. This was 26 percent higher compared to the previous 
period. The main items of Belarusian export to Moldova include oil products, tractors, ceramic 
tiles, oil bitumen, refrigerators and freezers, medicines, ethylene polymers, spare parts for mo-
tor vehicle sand tractors, chip-wood plates, and tyres. 
In 2004, new Belarusian commodities came to Moldova for the ﬁrst time. They include 
«Belkommunmash» trolleybuses used in the town of Belci. Metal-working machine tools are 
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supplied to re-equip industrial enterprises of Moldova. Belarusian medical devices are used by 
medical institutions of the country. 
In its turn, the Republic of Moldova is a traditional supplier to Belarus of fresh and 
canned fruits and vegetables, wines and cognac, seed and fodder corn, sunﬂower oil, and other 
agricultural produce.
In the current year, cooperation between the parties on supply of Moldovan fruits and 
vegetables to the consumer market of Belarus continues to enhance. In 2004, the total supply 
of products was 42,300 tons, which was 5,000 tons more than in 2003. This year, the Republic 
of Moldova plans to export to Belarus about 80,000 tons of fruits and vegetables. 
We do not disregard the traditionally good relations between peoples of our countries. 
Preservation of Belarusian culture, national identity and traditions, study of one’s own history 
and language, expansion and enhancing of relations between compatriots living in Moldova 
and their historical motherland go on, in general, successfully. However, new times require 
new, multi-facetted and dynamic solutions. 
Leaders of the GUAM countries state that this organization is given a new dynamism 
and its role in the post-Soviet space will grow. What is Moldova’s attitude towards prospects 
of existence of the CIS?
- A. S. At the GUAM summit held in Chisinau on 22 April 2005, Presidents of Azer-
baijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine made a decision to activate their actions within this 
association, and considered opportunities for cooperation with countries that are interested in 
GUAM activities. 
In this context, the Republic of Moldova, as the Chair of the GUAM, supports the posi-
tion to expand the format of cooperation of this association, as well as transformation of the 
GUAM into a regional organization. 
The priorities of the GUAM development, discussed at the Summit, include cooperation 
in such strategic ﬁelds as: energy, security, cooperation with international organizations and 
member countries of the European Union or candidates to the EU. This fact does not contradict 
cooperation between GUAM countries and other CIS countries. 
According to the Constitution, Moldova is a neutral state. How does this position agree 
with its strive to become member of NATO? 
- A. S. First of all, we should note that at the ofﬁcial level Moldova has not made decla-
rations about its strive to become member of NATO. At this stage, our main goal is to expand 
and intensify cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We do not speak so far 
about review of the neutral country status. 
During a recent visit to Brussels, the head of the state addressed this Alliance with a 
proposal to develop and introduce an Individual partnership action plan (IPAP) within the 
programme «Partnership for Peace», which, we hope, will improve our interaction with the 
Alliance. 
If we speak about concrete cooperation, then, for instance, in the ﬁeld of environmental 
security, NATO helped to implement a project on disposal of the missile fuel «mélange» which 
was present in the country and presented a threat due to its chemical properties. Today, NATO 
helps us implement several projects. For example, to eliminate hazardous pesticides which 
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were used in the past and are harmful for the environment. We also have an active cooperation 
along the Academy of Sciences. Owing to assistance by NATO, the Republic of Moldova was 
among the ﬁrst states which totally eliminated anti-personnel mines according to the Ottawa 
Convention of 1997. You see that beneﬁts from this cooperation are obvious, and we strive to 
increase them. The Republic of Moldova views NATO as an organization which gives seri-
ous opportunities for developing the country both in the civilian and military ﬁelds. Units of 
the Moldovan Army take regular part in military exercises organized within the context of the 
«Partnership for Peace». Some ofﬁcers take part in humanitarian actions of NATO. It is also 
important in this respect to indicate to the assistance of NATO experts to reform our National 
Army. We should also remember that strengthening of cooperation with NATO will have a 
positive impact on our European integration strive, because we consider the Plan of Actions 
between Moldova and the EU and the Individual partnership action plan with NATO as two 
mutually supplementing strategic documents. 
Which coming events of this year do you think the most important for Moldova?
- A. S. It is rather difﬁcult to identify a speciﬁc event. We can only note that, in assess-
ment of foreign observes, the Moldovan foreign policy has become more active in the recent 
years, as well as more consistent and clear. We have achieved some results along strategic lines 
and will make every effort to multiply these achievements. 
European integration, the process of resolution of the Trans-Dniester conﬂict, mainte-
nance of active ties with traditional partners and development of relations with new partners as 
well as regional cooperation represent a rather broad range. Important events will occur along 
all these lines. They include very signiﬁcant diplomatic activities, such as the summit of the 
heads of states planned for the 60th session of the UN General Assembly in mid September 
this year. 
Questions were asked by Roman Yakovlevsky. 30.06.05.
